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I. INTRODUCTION
International law is as potent as nations' proclivities to obey. For
hundreds of years, international relations and legal scholars have asked
why nations follow international norms. Recent scholarship recognizes
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
that internalization, or domestication, of international norms enhances
compliance. While the internalization of international law is inter-
national legal scholars' vogue mantra, these scholars have not delved
sufficiently into the process by which international law is drawn into
domestic systems. This Article will use a recent experiment in
internalization of international law as a window into its process and
limits.
Unlike many Latin American constitutions, the core of Argentina's
Constitution had not been significantly altered since 1853. As part of
the democratization process following the military dictatorship,
Argentina engaged in a major constitutional reform effort,
incorporating, by reference, nine prominent human rights treaties into
its Constitution. Thus, Argentina presents scholars with an ostensibly
prototypical example of legal internalization-internalization of
international law via constitutionalization.
Argentina's Constitution provides a glimpse at the dynamic process
by which nations internalize international norms. Argentina's
experiment, while young, has thus far produced rather limited results in
terms of compliance because it failed to empower, mobilize, and create
synergistic relationships among a diverse panoply of transnational actors
-individuals, politicians, non-governmental organizations ("NGOs"),
governmental entities and supranational bodies-that straddle
Argentina's legal, political and social spheres. Thus, the problems and
the promise of Argentina's constitutionalization experiment may be
traced to the identity, enthusiasm, and cohesiveness of the transnational
actors that coalesced to drive Argentina's internalization strategy.
II. COMPLIANCE, OBEDIENCE AND TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS
Internationalists in the legal community as well as the political
science community have long searched for answers to the "compliance
question"-why do nations comply with international law?-and its
derivatives: if we understand why nations comply with international
law, can we predict when they will comply and when they will disregard
international law? Or, can we structure rules and/or political
relationships that maximize compliance?
While the international law theoretical landscape evolved
significantly during the postwar years, the search for an answer to the
"compliance question" remained a constant thread. Classic rationalists
believe that nations comply with international law when the perceived
1999]
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benefits outweigh the perceived costs.' Rationalists have refined their
approaches, creating sophisticated game theory-inspired models
rearticulating their time-worn proposition: states abide by international
law when it is in their self-interest to do so.2 The New Haven School
links compliance to a communicative process of authoritative decision-
making on a domestic level which strives to maintain a world public
order of "human dignity."3  Regime theorists link compliance to
dispute-settlement mechanisms, information gathering mechanisms, and
concomitant retaliatory actions.4 Liberal theorists link compliance to
"liberal" political and economic structures.5  Liberal states and
1. Rationalists, sometimes referred to as interest theorists, believe that states comply with
international law when it suits their interests, primarily defined in terms of wealth and power.
The theory is systemic, resting on nation-states as the primary actors, and has been used
extensively in the arms control and trade contexts. For the classic rationalist approach, see
generally Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE (2d ed. 1979).
2. For modem examples of the rationalist approach, see generally John K. Setear, An
Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and
International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 139, 142-47 (1996); Kenneth W. Abbott, 'Trust but
Verify': The Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other International
Agreements, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1993); Kenneth W. Abbott, Modem International
Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989);
Kenneth W. Abbott, The Trading Nation's Dilemma: The Functions of the Law of International
Trade, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 501 (1985); Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoner's
Dilemma: ImplicationsforInternational Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL Sci. REV. 923
(1985); Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory oflnternationalPolitics, 38 WORLDPOL. 226 (1985).
3. See MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW, POWER, AND POLICY: A
CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTION 8 (1954); W. Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A
Process of Communication, 75 AM. SOC'Y INT'LL. PROC. 101, 107, 113 (1981) (describing the
New Haven School as a "communications model" which sees the legal process as comprising
three communicative streams----"policy content, authority signal and control intention"--which
thereby "liberates the inquirer from the... distorting model of positivism, which holds that law
is made by the legislature," in favor of the notion that "any communication between elites and
politically relevant groups which shapes wide expectations about appropriate future behavior
must be considered as functional lawmaking."). See generally Richard A. Falk, Casting the
Spell: The New Haven School of International Law, 104 YALE L.J. 1991 (1995); Symposium,
McDougal's Jurisprudence: Utility Influence, Controversy, 79 AM. SOC'Y INT'LL. PROC. 266
(1985) (remarks of Oscar Schacter); Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, The World
Constitutive Process ofAuthoritative Decision, 19 J. LEGALEDuc. 253 (1967). For an excellent
description ofthe New Haven School, see Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, InternationalLaw and
International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205, 209-11 (1993)
[hereinafter A Dual Agenda].
4. See generally ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: BUILDING REGIMES
FORNATURALRESOURCES ANDTHEENVIRONMENT (1989); Robert M. Axelrod,An Evolutionary
Approach to Norms, 80 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1095 (1986); ROBERTO. KEOHANE, JR., AFrER
HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICALECONOMY (1984); ROBERT
M. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); ORAN R. YOUNG, COMPLIANCE AND
PUBLIC AUTHORITY: A THEORY WITH INTERNATIONAL APPLICATIONS (1979).
5. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J.
INT'LL. 503, 511 (1995) [hereinafter International Law: Liberal States. See generally A Dual
Agenda, supra note 3; Anne-Marie Burley, LawAmong LiberalStates: Liberal Internationalism
and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907 (1992). Liberal theorists are sometimes
referred to as "identity" theorists.
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transnational actors therein comply with international agreements with
other liberal states because of a mutual perception that liberal legal
structures, primarily an independent judiciary, will foster compliance
and constrain deviation from an international norm.6 International
society theorists believe that the "norms, values, and social structure of
international society"7 condition compliance, particularly because
transnational actors have a "longer-term interest in the maintenance of
law-impregnated international community."8
Professor Harold Koh, in a recent series of articles, 9 asks a slightly
more nuanced and robust question-why do nations obey (rather than
comply with) international law?' ° The difference between compliance
and obedience is rather subtle. Compliance is norm-conforming
behavior conditioned by exogenous forces, that is, the desire to reap
certain benefits or avoid punishment;" while obedience is endogenous,
the voluntary accession to a norm incorporated into internal value
systems. Compliance is contingent, dependent on the consequences of
non-compliance (I will comply because I want X or do not want Y),
while obedience is a non-contingent embodiment of a rule or a norm.
While compliance may be begrudging, obedience is habitual, almost
instinctual. Through obedience, international norms become an
embedded part of a nation's legal fabric.'"
Then, how do nations come to obey, rather than merely comply
with, international law? Koh's answer: transnational legal process. 3
6. See International Law: Liberal States, supra note 5, at 532-33. See generallyA Dual
Agenda, supra note 3.
7. Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALEL.J. 2599,
2634 (1997) (reviewing ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONALREGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); THOMAS
M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1995)).
8. Id. (quoting Andrew Hurrell, International Society and the Study of Regimes: A
Reflective Approach, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 49, 59 (Volker
Rittberger ed., 1993)).
9. See generally Koh, supra note 7; Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process,
75 NEB. L. REV. 18 (1996).
10. See Koh, supra note 7, at 2603 & n. 13; see generally SECURING COMPLIANCE: SEVEN
CASE STUDIES (Martin L. Friedland ed., 1990).
11. See, e.g., Charles O'Reilly III & Jennifer Chatman, Organizational Commitment and
Psychological Attachment: The Effects of Compliance, Identification, and Internalization on
Prosocial Behavior, 71 J. APPL'D PSYCHOL 492, 493 (1986) (noting that compliance is
"instrumental involvement for specific, extrinsic rewards").
12. See Koh, supra note 7, at 2654.
13. Koh admits that transnational legal process presents little that is new. See id. at 2659
("This Review Essay has demonstrated that, far from being novel, domestic obedience to
internalized global law has venerable historical roots and sound theoretical footing."). Koh
recognizes that transnational legal process is the descendant of the International Legal Process
movement. See id. at 2620-24 (discussing the International Legal Process School and the New
Haven School as predecessors to transnational legal process). Koh also recognizes that Henry
1999]
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Transnational legal process links obedience to a complex,
multidimensional process of interaction, interpretation and
internalization. t4 Like many modem international legal theorists, Koh
recognizes that states do not constitute the universe of transnational
actors-individuals, corporations, non-governmental entities, public-
interest organizations, sub-governmental entities, regional organizations,
and international bodies play decisive roles in transnational legal
processes. These transnational actors are the engines of compliance,
and later, obedience. According to Koh, transnational legal process
involves three integrally-intertwined sub-processes: 1) interaction
among transnational actors generates international norms; 2) further
interaction in national and supranational fora leads to interpretation of
norms; and 3) concomitant internalization of international norms into
domestic legal systems results in compliance and, if the internalization
strategy is effective, ultimate obedience. t6 Transnational actors'
repeated norm-producing interaction and norm-illuminating
interpretations foster entrenchment of international law into domestic
legal systems, causing international norms to become "sticky" and
ultimately breeding not mere compliance, but rather, habitual
Steiner and Detlev Vagts pioneered the study of transnational legal process. See id. at 2626
(discussing HENRY STEINER &DETLEV VAGTS, TRANSNATIONALLEGALPROBLEMS (1968) (now
HENRY STEINER, DETLEV VAGTS & HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONALLEGALPROBLEMS
(4th ed. 1994)). He further admits that transnational legal process is an amalgamation of several
strands of international legal theory: (1) interest [see supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text];
(2) identity [see supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text]; (3) constructivist [(constructivists
believe that international norms play a significant constitutive role in defining national interests
and identities) (see Ngalre Woods, The Uses of Theory in the Study of International Relations,
in EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SINCE 1945, at 26 (Ngaire Woods ed., 1996);
Alexander Wendt, Constructing International Politics, 20 INT'L SECURITY 71 (1995);
Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the International State, 88 AM. Pot. SCI.
REV. 384 (1994))]; and (4) international society [see supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text].
Yet, for Koh, these roots strengthen, rather than diminish, the theoretical value of transnational
legal process. See Koh, supra note 7, at 2634.
14. See Koh, supra note 7, at 2645-58.
15. See id. at 2626 (transnational actors include "nation-states, international organizations,
multinational enterprises, nongovernmental organizations, and private individuals...").
16. See id. at 2602-03, 2646 ("[Transnational legal process] can be viewed as having three
phases. One or more transnational actors provokes an interaction (or series of interactions) with
another, which forces an interpretation or enunciation of the global norm applicable to the
situation. By so doing, the moving party seeks not simply to coerce the other party, but to
internalize the new interpretation of the international norm into the other party's internal
normative system. The aim is to 'bind' that other party to obey the interpretation as part of its
internal value set . . . . The transaction generates a legal rule which will guide future
transnational interactions between the parties; future transactions will further internalize those
norms; and eventually, repeated participation in the process will help to reconstitute the interests
and even the identities of the participants in the process.").
Koh explores isolated examples of "transnational legal process" in action. For Koh's
discussion of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Reinterpretation Debate, see id. at 2646-48. For
his discussion of the Middle East peace process, see id. at 2651-54. For his discussion of the
Haitian refugee interdiction policy, see Koh, supra note 9, at 196-99.
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obedience. 7 Thus, transnational legal process is a robust theory that
emanates descriptive, prescriptive, and predictive energy.
While the ultimate bridge to obedience is internalization of
international law, transnational legal process envisions internalization
processes that are necessarily fluid, loosely defined by transnational
actors' interests, which may respond to and be reconstituted as a result
of transnational processes. In his work, Koh suggests that
internalization strategies may involve social,"8 political, 9 and/or legal2 °
mechanisms; he also offers several illustrative glimpses of these
internalization processes at work.2' Yet for all of its energy and all of
its dynamism, transnational legal process theory's treatment of its
crucial and defining link-international law's penetration into domestic
systems-is rather thin. Transnational legal process thus beckons
scholars to take a deep, exploratory dive into the dynamics of
internalization processes or, as Koh phrases it, the nature of the
"transmission belt."22 Koh implicitly admits this, concluding his piece
with a plea to the international legal and scholarly communities to
develop strategies for internalization. This Article, which explores one
particular internalization strategy-internalization via
constitutionalization-is a response to his plea.
III. CONST1TuTIONALIZATION OFHUMAN RIGHTS IN ARGENTINA: THE
CONTEXT
A. Argentina's Constitutional Reform
Unlike many Latin American constitutions, Argentina's
Constitution was a portrait of longevity, dating from 1853.24
17. See Koh, supra note 7, at 2646, 2649, 2651, 2655.
18. See id. at 2656 ("Social internalization occurs when a norm acquires so much public
legitimacy that there is widespread general obedience to it.").
19. See id. at 2656-57 ("Political internalization occurs when political elites accept an
international norm, and adopt it as a matter of government policy.").
20. See id. at 2657 ("Legal internalization occurs when an international norm is
incorporated into the domestic legal system through executive action, judicial interpretation,
legislative action, or some combination of the three.").
21. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
22. Koh, supra note 7, at 2651.
23. See id. at 2656-59.
24. See CONST. ARG. (1853) 9-49 (Editorial Universidad, 1990) (translations of the 1853
Argentine Constitution are by the Author). Although the core of Argentina's Constitution has
remained constant since 1853, there have been several amendments since 1853. For example,
in 1860 the Convencidn Nacional bolstered the powers of the federal government vis-A-vis the
provinces, abolished slavery, and limited the government's power to restrict individual liberties,
including freedom of the press; in 1866 the Convenci6n Nacional constitutionalized several
federal taxes; in 1898 the Convencidn Nacional changed the representation in the Cdmara de
1999]
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Argentina's Constitution largely echoed the U. S. Constitution, espe-
cially regarding separation of powers and federalism. 5 The 1853
Constitution did not explicitly address human rights treaties, or even
international law in general. Like the U.S. Constitution, the 1853
Constitution divided power over international treaties among the three
independent branches: "The Congress shall approve or disapprove of
treaties concluded with other nations" ;26 the Executive shall conclude
and sign treaties with foreign powers and receive their ministers; 27 and
the federal courts shall have jurisdiction over matters pertaining to
international treaties.28
From 1976 through 1983, Argentina suffered a brutal military
dictatorship, during which thousands "disappeared. ' 29 These severe
Diputados (House of Representatives); and in 1957 the Convenci6n Nacional added a provision
that enhanced the rights of workers. See id. at 55-67. See also Larry Rohter, In Latin America,
'The Constitution is What I Say It Is,' N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1998, at 1 (noting the tendency of
many Latin American countries to edit their constitutions frequently).
25. See CONST. ARG. (1853) at 22-49 (Second Part: National Authority). In fact, the
Argentine Supreme Court frequently cites U.S. Supreme Court decisions as authoritative. See
generally Jonathan M. Miller, JudicialReview and Constitutional Stability: A Sociology of the
U.S. Model and its Collapse in Argentina, 21 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 77 (1997);
Jonathan M. Miller, The Authority of a Foreign Talisman: A Study of U.S. Constitutional
Practice as Authority in Nineteenth CenturyArgentina and the Argentine Elite's Leap of Faith,
46 AM. U. L. REV. 1483 (1997).
26. CONST. ARG. (1853) art. 67(19).
27. See CONST. ARG. (1853) art. 86(14) (the President shall have the power to "conclude
and sign treaties regarding peace, commerce, navigation, alliance, neutrality, accords, and other
negotiations required for the maintenance of good relations with foreign powers, as well as
receive their ministers and admit their consuls.").
28. See CONST. ARG. (1853) art. 100 ("The Supreme Court and the inferior federal
tribunals shall have jurisdiction over all causes of action regarding... treaties with foreign
nations.").
29. Following violence and political polarization that occurred during the mid-1970's, a
junta of military dictators--General Videla, Admiral Massera, and Brigadier Agosti-took
control of Argentina's government. Engaged in a war against "subversion" and in the name of
"national security," the junta suspended civil liberties and imposed a state of siege. See CARLOS
SANTIAGO NINO, RADICALEvILONTRIAL53-54(1996). National security forces abducted those
who were engaged in "subversive" activities, brought them to clandestine detention centers,
tortured and interrogated them, and frequently killed them. See id. at 54. Recent confessions
on the part of ex-military officials reveal that the military threw many prisoners from airplanes
over the Atlantic Ocean. See Laurie Goering,Argentine 'Dirty War' Informer Vilified: Ex-Navy
Officer Details Killings in '70s Oppression, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 7, 1997, at 6. For a haunting
discussion of the modus operandi of the military, including a description of torture techniques
and detention centers, see COMISION NACIONAL SOBRE LA DESAPARACI6N DE PERSONAS
(CONADEP), NUNCA MAS (1985) (truth commission's accounting of dirty war atrocities).
While the official estimates are that 10,000 "disappeared," most human rights groups believe
that the number is closer to 30,000. See Argentina to Release List of 'Disappeared,' Human
Rights Groups CallforMore Detailsfrom 1970s 'Dirty War,' CHI. TRIB., Mar. 26, 1995, at 10;
David Chrieberg, 'I Can't Erase This,' NEWSWEEK, Mar. 27, 1995, at 38.
The military dictatorship remained strong from 1976 to 1980, but began to falter
thereafter for several reasons. First, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, coupled
with the pro-human rights stance of President Jimmy Carter, turned international opinion
against the military dictatorship. See NINO, supra, at 60. Second, Britain defeated Argentina's
[37:281
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human rights abuses were the backdrop to subsequent democratization
efforts and, ultimately, the 1994 constitutional reform. When President
Rafil Alfonsfn, a member of the Radical Party, ushered in democracy in
the wake of the military dictatorship, he promised to fight human rights
abuses prospectively, principally through prophylactic legislative
action. Toward this end, he convoked El Consejo para la
Consolidaci6n de la Democracia (the Advisory Commission for the
Consolidation of Democracy, or Advisory Commission)3 and included
in the group's charge a study of a major constitutional reform
initiative.32 After extensive consideration, the Advisory Commission
recommended that the President convene a Constitutional Assembly to
undertake the first comprehensive constitutional reform since 1853 and
highlighted several substantive issues for reform.33 With regard to
human rights, the Advisory Commission implored any constitutional
assembly to "amplify and strengthen" individual rights and, under no
circumstances, diminish or limit such rights. 34  The Advisory
military with great speed and ease during the Falklands War, thus discrediting Argentina's
military. See id. at 60-61. Third, non-governmental organizations, most prominently the
Madres de Plaza de Mayo, began to publicize the disappearances. See id. at 59. Fourth, the
economy declined. See id. at 60.
There is a vast literature on Argentina's military dictatorship, referred to as the "dirty
war." For a representative sample, see NINO, supra, at41-104 (describing Argentina's history,
from the dirty war through democratization); ALISON BRYSK, THE PoLIrICs OF HUMAN RIGHTS
IN ARGENTINA: PROTEST, CHANGE, AND DEMOCRATIZATION (1994); MARTIN E. ANDERSON,
DOSSIER SECRETO: ARGENTINA'S DESAPARECIDOSANDTHE MYTH OFTHE "DIRTY WAR" (1993);
lAIN GUEST, BEHINDTHE DISAPPEARANCES: ARGENTINA'S DIRTY WAR AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS
ANDTHEUNITED NATIONS (1990); Alejandro M. Garro, Nine Years of Transition to Democracy
in Argentina: Partial Failure or Qualified Success?, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1993);
Carlos S. Nino, The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put Into Context: The Case
ofArgentina, 100 YALE L. J. 2619 (1991); LAWRENCE WESCHLER, A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE:
SETTLING AccouNTs WITH TORTURERS (1990).
30. See NINO, supra note 29, at 67-73. President Alfonsin also attempted to impose
"retroactivejustice" through domestic criminal trials of the militaryjunta. For a description and
assessment of these trials, see generally id. President Menem ultimately pardoned all those who
were convicted in these trials. See id. at 103-04.
31. See EDITORIAL UNIVERSITARIA DE BUENOS AIRES, REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL:
DICTAMEN PRELIMINAR DEL CONSEJO PARA LA CONSOLIDACI6N DE LA DEMOCRACIA 7 (1986).
32. See id. at 8, 13-14.
33. The Advisory Commission believed such reform was necessary for the following
reasons: 1) the executive had neutralized or nullified the effects of prior reform (amendment)
efforts; 2) structural and substantive constitutional defects had limited the previous
Constitution's force and effectiveness; 3) the political philosophies upon which the original
Constitution rested had shifted; 4) while there was robust political debate on many issues, there
was broad social consensus regarding the need for structural reform in the wake of the
dictatorship; and 5) while some argued that the constitutional reform effort should await a
period of calm, the Advisory Commission believed that some of the most profound
constitutional moments followed a period of significant unrest and upheaval. See id. at 23-30.
34. Id. at 39 (noting in particular that the following articles of the 1853 Argentine
Constitution should not be limited or circumscribed: Article 14 (rights of labor); Article 15
(abolition of slavery and the prohibition thereof); Article 16 (abolishing nobility); Article 19
(right to privacy); and Article 20 (equal rights of foreigners)).
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COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
Commission made several suggestions regarding the constitutional
status of international law: 1) grant Congress the power to delegate
certain functions to supranational entities; 2) make all international
treaties self-executing35 upon congressional ratification; and 3) establish
the superiority of international treaties over domestic law.36
Despite the meticulous and painstaking work of the Advisory
Commission, the constitutional reform project languished with the
Alfonsfn government.37 The reform project was not to be revived until
1993, when, following extreme animosity and partisanship between
President Menem (the Peronist Party) and the discredited Radical Party,
the two camps agreed to proceed with the constitutional reform.38 The
public viewed the agreement, known as the "Pacto de Olivos," as
shrouded in a cloak of partisan suspicion, seeing it as a mere
opportunity for the Peronists to consolidate and extend their power and
for the Radical Party to create an institutional and programmatic space
for themselves in the wake of its discredited government.39 The ensuing
law divided the substantive reform effort into two components: a
nucleus of mandatory reforms4" and a peripheral group of themes for
possible consideration.4 Congress did not include human rights per se
35. A self-executing treaty is one that is enforceable law without enabling legislation.
Likewise, a non-self-executing treaty is unenforceable absent legislative action. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTHE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OFTHE UNITED STATES § 111 (1986)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
36. See EDITORIAL UNIVERS1TARIA DE BUENOS AIRES, supra note 31, at 82-83.
37. President Alfonsfn's constitutional reform efforts were impeded by an economic crisis
due to such factors as an inflated public sector and massive foreign debt. See Lita Olbrich, Only
Economic Restructuring Can Save Argentina, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 16, 1989, at 31 A.
Nevertheless, Alfonsfn remained tireless in his efforts to consolidate democracy. See generally
NINO, supra note 29, at 99-104. In addition to the severe military crisis, President Alfonsfn
faced threats of military coup and political unrest. See id. at 90-104; Jill Smolowe, Caught in
a Revolving Door: Alfonsin's State of Siege is Hobbled by the Courts, TIME, Nov. 11, 1995, at
53.
38. President Menem hoped to amend the Constitution to enable him to remain in office
beyond the constitutionally circumscribed term. In exchange for Radical Party (Alfonsfn)
support for this amendment, President Menem agreed to comprehensive constitutional reform.
See Christopher M. Nelson, An Opportunity for Constitutional Reform in Argentina: Re-
Election 1995,25 U. MIAMI INTER-AM L. REV. 283,294 (1994); Juan C. Vega, Contexto Social
y Politico de la Reforma Constitucional de 1994 in JERARQUiA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LOS
TRATADOS INTERNACIONALES 1,2-3 (Juan Carlos Vega & Marisa Adriana Graham eds., 1996)
(translations by the Author). The text of the agreement became Law No. 24,309 (on file with
Author). See also infra notes 165-70 and accompanying text.
39. See VEGA, supra note 38, at 2-5.
40. This nucleus included the following issues: Presidential reelection; reduction of the
Presidential term to four years; lengthening of the annual legislative session; direct election of
the Mayor of Buenos Aires; limitation on the President's power to act via executive decree; and
auditing of the federal coffers. See id. at 9-10.
41. The list of peripheral themes included: strengthening of the federal government;
municipal autonomy; popular initiatives and consultations; updating of Congressional and
Executive functions; investigative and enforcement powers of Congress; institutions dealing
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in either group, although it included issues concerning international
treaties in the latter and created a committee within the Constitutional
Assembly, the Comisi6n de Integraci6n y Tratados Internacionales
(Commission on Integration and International Treaties, or Treaty
Commission), to study the status of international treaties and create
mechanisms to further regional integration efforts.4"
While post- 1994 provisions regarding executive and judicial power
vis- t-vis international treaties remained highly reminiscent of the 1853
Constitution,43 Article 75(22) of the 1994 Constitution, ostensibly
concerning legislative powers, dramatically altered the Argentine
Constitution's substantive treatment of human rights, as well as the legal
status of international human rights treaties. The new provision
specifies the following: 1) Congress will approve or reject treaties
concluded with other nations, with international organizations, and with
the Holy See; 2) all international treaties (currently ratified, as well as
those that Argentina may ratify in the future) are superior to domestic
laws; 3) several human rights treaties enjoy constitutional status;' 4)
none of these treaties may limit any of the rights granted in the first part
of the Constitution;45 5) human rights treaties may be renounced by the
with integration and international treaties; the defense of democracy; the preservation of the
environment; an executive commission to investigate economic/social issues; indigenous
communities; consumer rights; and habeas corpus/direct constitutional appeals. See id. at 10.
42. See id. at 11-12.
43. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. See also CONST. ARG. (1994). Article
99(11) regarding executive power over international treaties in the 1994 Constitution is similar
to Article 86(14) in the 1853 Constitution. Article 116 regarding judicial power over
international treaties in the 1994 Constitution is identical to Article 100 in the 1853 version.
44. The following treaties have constitutional standing: American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man, signed May 2, 1948, OEA/Ser.L./V./I.4, rev. 6 (1965); American
Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) [hereinafter American
Convention]; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res.
217(III)A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 [hereinafter Universal Declaration]; International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Political Rights, concluded Dec. 16, 1996,993 U.N.T.S. 4 (entered
into force Jan. 3, 1976); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, concluded Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 3, 1976) [hereinafter International
Covenant]; Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
concluded Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 302 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976);
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, concluded Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 227 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951); International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, concluded Dec. 21, 1965,660 U.N.T.S. 195
(entered into force Jan. 4, 1969); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, concluded Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969);
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 15, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(1985); Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 44th
Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 166, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1990).
All other international treaties are superior to domestic statutes but inferior to the
Constitution. See infra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
45. See CONST. ARG. (1994) arts. 1-42 (Declarations, Rights, and Guarantees; New Rights
and Guarantees).
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executive, with the prior approval of two-thirds of both houses of the
legislature, a procedure similar to that required for constitutional
amendments;46 and 6) other human rights treaties and conventions,
approved by Congress, require a two-thirds vote of both houses of the
legislature in order to endow them with constitutional standing.47 The
Constitutional Assembly also included a new provision promoting
regional integration.48
B. Human Rights and South American Constitutions
As the following perusal of South American constitutions4 9
demonstrates, Argentina's constitutionalization of human rights was a
unique development in the region. Substantively, while international
human rights norms infiltrate national constitutions to greater or lesser
degrees, Argentina's Constitution is a unique, verbatim replica of these
treaties. In terms of status, Argentina is the only country that grants
human rights treaties constitutional standing. The following section
groups South American constitutions along these two comparative axes
-substance and status-illustrating that Argentina's Constitution is a
lone outlier. This section merely attempts to classify constitutions vis-h-
vis their treatment of international human rights norms and/or treaties;
it does not assess the relative effectiveness of different constitutional
approaches in the protection of human rights.
46. See id. art. 30. (setting forth the procedures for amending the Constitution: "The
Constitution may be amended entirely or in any of its parts. The necessity of amendment must
be declared by the Congress by a vote of at least two-thirds of the members; but it shall not be
effected except by a convention called for the purpose.").
47. For the full text of Article 75(22), see CONST. ARG. (1994).
48. See CONST. ARG. (1994) art. 75(24) (Congress shall have the power to "approve
integration treaties which delegate competences and jurisdiction to interstate organizations
concerned with reciprocal and equal conditions and which respect the democratic order and
human rights. Any standards dictated pursuant thereto supersede the laws."). See also infra
note 243 and accompanying text.
49. This Author chooses to limit her comparison to South American constitutions for the
following reasons: 1) most, if not all, have been rewritten, or significantly revised in the post-
World War II period; 2) the region has shared a recent history of human rights abuses and thus
shares a desire to combat future human rights abuses; and 3) the geographical and cultural
proximity to Argentina.
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1. Substantive Incorporation of Human Rights Norms
Many modem constitutions ° incorporate human rights norms,
borrowing from international and regional human rights treaties. While
many human rights treaties could serve as comparative reference points,
this Article selects the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (the "International Covenant")5 and the American Convention
on Human Rights (the "American Convention") 52 because they
comprehensively attempt to address and redress the most heinous of the
civil and political rights abuses that became commonplace in South
America during the military dictatorships.5 3
50. For human rights purposes, a modem constitution is one that post-dates World War
II; for prior to World War II, international law did not recognize the human being-the
individual-as an international actor who bears international rights. See Louis HENKIN, THE
RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY 18 (1978); IAN BROWNUE, PRINCIPLES OFPUBLIC INTERNATIONALLAW
323-45 (4th ed. 1990); Steven R. Rattier, The Schizophrenias of International Criminal Law,
33 TEx. INT'LL.J. 237,242 (1998); Tom Farer, hztroduction to INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS: TEN YEARS OF ACTIVITIES 1971-1981 v-vi (1982). See also The London
Charter, Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT), Agreement for the Prosecution
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945,58 Stat. 1544,
82 U.N.T.S. 280. The London Charter is the document that constituted the Nuremberg Tribunal,
christened the modem human rights era, and delineated the causes of action for which the allies
intended to try the Nazi defendants, including crimes against humanity----"murder,
extermination, enslavement, or any other inhumane act committed against any civilian
population before or during the war, as well as persecution based on political, religious, or racial
grounds ... regardless of whether the accused had violated the domestic law of the countries
where the deeds had been committed." Id. art. 6. Through its definition of crimes against
humanity, the London Charter recognized and legitimized the two salient features of modem
international human rights law: 1) the individual is the beneficiary of the rights; and 2) certain
rights are universal, superior to the dictates of national law.
Also following World War II, the international community joined to create an
international body, the United Nations, that would presumably forestall the type of international
"meltdown" that had ripened into such a devastating war. The United Nations Charter lists
promotion of and respect for "human rights and for fundamental freedoms" among its primary
animating purposes. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1. Beyond flagging human rights as a
preeminent concern, the Charter did not specifically contemplate any substantive rights.
Instead, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration, providing all
individuals with the rights to equality; life; liberty; travel; privacy; participation in government
through election or otherwise; protections during criminal trials; and freedom of thought,
religion, and assembly. In addition, the Universal Declaration sets forth several economic- and
social-oriented rights, including the rights to work; social security; rest and leisure; a "standard
of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family"; education; and
participation in cultural life. See generally Universal Declaration, supra note 44. While the
Universal Declaration is not a treaty, nor is it legally binding on states, many of its provisions
have become embedded in customary and/or conventional international law, and thus, have
arguably become binding on states.
51. See International Covenant, supra note 44.
52. See American Convention, supra note 44.
53. In choosing to focus on the International Covenant and the American Convention, this
Author by no means implies that the rights contained in other human rights treaties (most
notably those delineated supra note 44) are any less significant. However, the political and civil
rights contained in the International Covenant and the American Convention contain the
building blocks of international human rights law and hence are often called the "first
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The survey revealed that South American constitutions fall into one
of two broad groups.54 The first group includes constitutions that
incorporate the "spirit" of human rights treaties.55 In general, these
constitutions are skeletal reflections of international human rights
treaties, incorporating many core rights-core ideas-but lacking the
flesh to make these rights as robust as their treaty-based counterparts.
The second group, on the other hand, incorporates the texture and
nuances of international treaty-based rights.
Constitutions in the first group frequently are "missing" several
rights found in the international treaties, leaving conspicuous gaps in the
constitutional treatment of human rights. None of the constitutions in
this group contain the following rights: the right to self-determination;56
an explicit gender equality provision;57 a provision for the minimum due
process rights for aliens facing expulsion; 8 a prohibition on traffic in
women; 59 or the right to recognition as a person before the law.6" Most
constitutions in this group lack a provision promising prisoners
"humane" treatment, including segregation of convicted criminals from
those criminal defendants awaiting trial and segregation of juveniles
from adults;6 granting ethnic or religious minorities the right to enjoy
their culture and group identity;6' prohibiting war propaganda and
advocacy of racial, national or religious hate;63 and prohibiting
imprisonment for contractual debt.64 A few of the constitutions have
some dramatic omissions. The Venezuelan and Uruguayan
generation" of human rights. See generally Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law:
Protection of the Rights of the Individual Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 17-32
(1982).
54. For a comprehensive comparison of South American constitutions, please refer to
Table 3: Constitutional Treatment of Human Rights in South America, which is appended to
this Article.
55. See CONST.BOL (1967, amended 1995); CONST. CHILE(1980, amended 1989); CONST.
PERU (1993); CONST. URU. (1967, reinstated 1985); CONST. VENEZ. (1961, amended 1983).
56. See International Covenant, supra note 44, art. 1.
57. See id. art. 3.
58. See id. art. 13; American Convention, supra note 44, art. 22(6).
59. See American Convention, supra note 44, art. 6.
60. See International Covenant, supra note 44, art. 16; American Convention, supra note
44, art. 3.
61. See International Covenant, supra note 44, art. 10; American Convention, supra note
44, art. 5. Chile's Constitution provides for segregation of convicted and arrested prisoners but
does not provide for segregation of juveniles from adults. See CONST. CHILE art. 19(7)(d).
Thus, this constitutional provision is narrower than the international counterparts.
62. See International Covenant, supra note 44, art. 27. But see CONST. PERU art. 2(19).
63. See International Covenant, supra note 44, art. 20; American Convention, supra note
44, art. 13(5). But see CONST. VENEZ. art. 66.
64. See International Covenant, supra note 44, art. 11; American Convention, supra note
44, art. 7(7). But see CONST. PERU art. 2(24)(c); CONST. URU. art. 52.
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Constitutions contain no clause prohibiting slavery and slave trade.65
Chile's Constitution contains no prohibition on torture or other cruel,
inhumane or degrading treatment.66 Uruguay's Constitution does not
proscribe the use of ex post facto laws67 and does not grant citizens
freedom of thought, conscience or religion.68 While the American
Convention also excludes some of these rights,69 the aforementioned
constitutions are striking in their omission of several rights in addition
to those that the American Convention chose not to codify.
Those rights that the constitutions include tend to be skeletal
replicas of the rather developed rights found in the International
Covenant and the American Convention.7" Other rights are significantly
less expansive in scope. For example, criminal defense rights are
65. See International Covenant, supra note 44, art. 8; American Convention, supra note
44, art. 6.
66. See International Covenant, supra note 44, art. 7; American Convention, supra note
44, art. 5(2).
67. See International Covenant, supra note 44, art. 15; American Convention, supra note
44, art. 9.
68. See International Covenant, supra note 44, art. 18; American Convention, supra note
44, art. 12.
69. The American Convention does not include the following: the right to self-
determination [see International Covenant, supra note 44, art. 1]; an explicit gender equality
provision [although the American Convention has a generic equal protection clause, (see
American Convention, supra note 44, art. 24), it does not explicitly provide for gender equality
(see International Covenant, supra note 44, art. 3)]; and the right of ethnic and religious
minorities to enjoy their culture and group identity [see International Covenant, supra note 44,
art. 27]. See also Table 2 in the Appendix for a comparison of the International Covenant and
the American Convention.
70. For example, the International Covenant states in Article 21: "The right of peaceful
assembly shall be recognized. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other
than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health
or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." International Covenant, supra
note 44, art. 21. Likewise, Article 22 states: "1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of
association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of
interests. 2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which
are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection
of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful
restrictions on members of the armed forces and of the police in their exercise of this right."
International Covenant, supra note 44, art. 22. The American Convention provides for similar
rights. See American Convention, supra note 44, arts. 15, 16. In contrast, Bolivia merely grants
each person the right "[to] assemble and to associate for lawful purpose." CONST. BOL. art. 7(c).
Venezuela merely grants each person the "right of association for lawful ends" and the "right
to meet with others, publicly or privately without previous permission, for lawful ends and
without arms." CONST. VENEZ. arts. 70,71. In addition, the international instruments' family
rights provisions (see International Covenant, supra note 44, art. 23; American Convention,
supra note 44, art. 17), which not only highlight the preeminence of the family but which
further grant the right to consensual marriage and equality of spouses during marriage and upon
dissolution, give way to simplistic proclamations that "[t]he family is the basis of our society,"
(CONST. URU. art. 40), and that "[tihe family is the basic core of society" (CONST. CHILE art. 1).
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generally sparse, granting many fewer protections than those granted in
the International Covenant and American Convention.7" The freedom
of conscience and religion clauses in some constitutions are rather
narrow.72 As opposed to the approach in the international treaties, many
constitutions' "right to life" provisions do not evince discomfort with
71. See International Covenant, supra note 44, art 14; American Convention, supra note
44, art. 8. See also Table 2 in the Appendix for a delineation of the rights of criminal
defendants in the International Covenant and the American Convention, and Table 3 in the
Appendix for a comparison of South American constitutions vis-h-vis these rights.
The Constitution of Bolivia merely includes protection from self-incrimination, a
presumption of innocence, a general right to a defense, and the right to be assisted by a defense
attorney. See CONST. BOL arts. 14, 16.
The Constitution of Peru only provides for a few criminal defense protections, namely
the presumption of innocence and a prohibition on the admissibility of coerced statements
(which is not explicitly set forth in the International Covenant or American Convention), and
lacks most of the other rights found in the International Covenant and American Convention.
See CONST. PERU arts. 2(24)(e), 2(24)(h).
The Constitution of Venezuela provides for some criminal defense rights, but it does not
provide for a right to defense counsel, a right to an interpreter, a right to prepare a defense, or
a right to appeal. See CONST. VENEZ. art. 60.
The Constitution of Chile, in its delineation of criminal defense rights, includes
provisions regarding the following: adequate time for the preparation of defenses, a prohibition
on double jeopardy, the right to an interpreter, and the right to be informed of the charges
pending against the criminal defendant. See CONST. CHILE arts. 19(3), 7.
Uruguay's criminal rights provisions lack the right to be informed of charges; the right
to a defense lawyer; the right to an interpreter; a prohibition on placing a criminal defendant in
double jeopardy; and the right to an appeal. See CONST. URU arts. 12, 20-22.
72. For example, the Constitution of Bolivia contains a rather narrow freedom of thought
and freedom of religion clause. The International Covenant provides that "Everyone shall have
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to
have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or believe in worship,
observance, practice and teaching." International Covenant, supra note 44, art. 18(1). The
American Convention provides, "Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience and of
religion. This right includes freedom to maintain or to change one's religion or beliefs, and
freedom to profess or disseminate one's religion or beliefs either individually or together with
others, in public or in private." American Convention, supra note 44, art. 12(1). The
Constitution of Boliviastates, "The State recognizes and upholds the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Religion. It guarantees the public exercise of any other worship." CONST. BOL art. 3. Bolivia
merely guarantees the public, not the private, exercise of worship, and does not explicitly
protect freedom of thought or conscience; nor does Bolivia's Constitution fully develop the
right in terms of choices and dissemination of ideas.
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the death penalty.73 Constitutional clauses regarding torture appear thin
when juxtaposed with international analogs. 74
Some constitutional provisions in this group ostensibly mimic
international treaties but carve elastic exceptions that envelop the
substantive right. Some constitutions exclude entire groups of people
from constitutional protections. Frequently, "state of emergency"
provisions, which allow the executive (usually with some type of
nodding acquiescence from the legislature) to suspend certain rights in
the face of an extreme crisis, are artfully drafted to create gaping
loopholes that detract from the potency of many rights. Sometimes the
triggering event-the emergency-is defined in such broad, catch-all
terms that the executive could "legitimately" invoke the "state of
emergency" clause in a wide range of situations.76 The International
73. The International Covenant and the American Convention strongly disfavor the death
penalty's use in their "right to life" provisions. See International Covenant, supra note 44, art.
6; American Convention, supra note 44, art. 4. These instruments support the abolition of the
death penalty [see International Covenant, supra note 44, art. 6(6); American Convention, supra
note 44, art. 4(3)], and, at a minimum, proscribe countries from imposing the death penalty for
anything but the most serious crimes [see International Covenant, supra note 44, art. 6(2);
American Convention, supra note 44, art. 4(2)], and from extending the death penalty "to
crimes to which it does not presently apply" [American Convention, supra note 44, art. 4(2)].
Peru's "right to life" provision does not bar or curtail the death penalty's use but merely states
that "Every person has the right to life, to his identity, to his moral, spiritual, and physical
integrity." CONST. PERU art. 2(1). Chile's "right to life" provision does not disapprove of or
strongly disfavor the death penalty, stating, "The Constitution guarantees to all persons the right
to life and to the physical and psychological integrity of the individual .... The death penalty
may only be instituted for a crime considered in law approved by a qualified quorum." CONST.
CHILE art. 19(1).
74. The International Covenant and the American Convention respectively state that no
one "shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhumane, or degrading punishment or treatment."
International Covenant, supra note 44, art. 7; American Convention, supra note 44, art. 5(2).
The Constitution of Venezuela states that "No one may be.. . subjected to torture or to other
proceedings which cause physical or moral suffering." CONST. VENEZ. art. 60(3). This
phrasing is conspicuously distinct and appears to be narrower than the International Covenant
or the American Convention. The Constitution of Uruguay prohibits brutal treatment in prisons
but does not prohibit such treatment outside of prisons, nor is it clear that brutal treatment
encompasses all instances when the proscription on "torture or other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment" may apply. CONST. URU. art. 26.
75. For instance, Peru's constitutional provision regarding "personal freedom and
security" contains many of the same protections found in Article 9 of the International Covenant
and in Article 7 of the American Convention-no arbitrary arrest, right to be informed about
the reasons for the arrest, prompt recourse to judicial scrutiny of legality of custody-but
suspends these very protections when suspected drug traffickers, terrorists, or spies are under
scrutiny. See CONST. PERU art. 2(24)(f).
76. Certain rights may only be suspended under the International Covenant "[iun time of
public emergency which threatens the life of the nation." International Covenant, supra note
44, art. 4(1). The American Convention's "state of emergency" provisions may only be invoked
"[iun time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence or security
of a State Party." American Convention, supra note 44, art. 27(1).
Peru's Constitution sanctions usage of the "state of emergency" clause "in case of a
disturbance of the peace or of the internal order, catastrophe, or grave circumstances affecting
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Covenant and American Convention do not allow derogation of certain
rights, even when a "state of emergency" is in effect.7 7  Most
constitutions, like the International Covenant and the American
Convention, limit the number of rights/prohibitions that the executive
and/or legislature may curtail. This list, however, is frequently shorter
than the International Covenant and the American Convention, meaning
that the number of suspendable rights is somewhat greater.78 In
providing for basic core rights, these constitutions are true to the "spirit"
of the international human rights treaties but do not mirror their
nuances, depth, or texture.
The second group of constitutions" integrates not merely the spirit,
but also the letter, of international human rights treaties. These
constitutions emulate, or even surpass, international treaties in scope
and breadth. In this group, international treaties conspicuously infiltrate
national constitutions, serving as models for the content and scope of
constitutional rights.
In general, the constitutions in the second group contain most of
the rights enumerated in the International Covenant and the American
Convention."° Constitutional provisions tend to mirror international
the life of the nation." CONST. PERU art. 137(1). Venezuela's "state of emergency" clause
covers internal or external conflicts, "disorder that may disturb the peace," or "grave
circumstances that affect economic or social life." CONST. VENEZ. arts. 240-41. Under Chile's
state of emergency provision, enumerated rights may be suspended during "foreign or internal
war, internal disturbances, emergency, and public calamity." CONST. CHILE art. 39.
77. The International Covenant and the American Convention do not permit suspension
of the following rights/prohibitions: right to life [see International Covenant, supra note 44, art.
6; American Convention, supra note 44, art. 4]; freedom of thought [see International Covenant,
supra note 44, art. 18; American Convention, supra note 44, art. 13]; torture [see International
Covenant, supra note 44, art. 7; American Convention, supra note 44, art. 5(2)], slavery [see
International Covenant, supra note 44, art. 8; American Convention, supra note 44, art. 6],
imprisonment for contractual liability [see International Covenant, supra note 44, art. 11;
American Convention, supra note 44, art. 7(7)]; expostfacto laws [see International Covenant,
supra note 44, art. 15; American Convention, supra note 44, art. 9]; and recognition as a person
before the law [see International Convention, supra note 44, art. 16]. In addition, the American
Convention does not allow derogation from the following rights: right to judicial personality
[See American Convention, supra note 44, art. 3]; right to family [see id. art. 17]; children's
rights [see id. arts. 17(5), 18, 19, 20]; and the right to participate in government [see id. art. 23].
78. For example, Venezuela apparently permits the suspension of most rights. See CONST.
VENEZ. arts. 240-42, 244. Similarly, Uruguay allows the derogation of all rights related to
individual security in order to apprehend "guilty parties," presumably including the right to life,
the prohibition on torture, and the prohibition on punishment for contractual liability. See
CONST. URU. art. 31.
79. See CONST. BRAZ. (1988); CONST. COLOM. (1991); CONST. ECUADOR (1979, amended
1992); CONST. PARA. (1992).
80. The Constitution of Brazil is the most stunning, at least touching upon all of the rights
except for one: the right to recognition as a person. The Constitution of Colombia is only
missing three rights: the right to self-determination (which is not included in the American
Convention); an explicit provision regarding segregation of different types of prisoners; and a
prohibition on war propaganda and advocacy of racial, national or religious hate. The
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rights;8 other provisions, most notably constitutional protection of
criminal defendants,82 are significantly more robust than those
developed in the international instruments.83 Some constitutions expand
the scope of various rights.84 Other constitutional rights are more potent
Constitution of Ecuador lacks four rights: an explicit provision regarding segregation of
different types of prisoners; a provision regarding due process rights for aliens facing expulsion;
the right to recognition as a person; and a prohibition on war propaganda and advocacy of
racial, national or religious hate. The Constitution of Paraguay is missing the right to self-
determination, the right to recognition as a person, prohibition of war propaganda, and basic
children's rights.
81. For example, the International Covenant and the American Convention mandate State
Parties to segregate certain classes of prisoners from other classes: juveniles must be segregated
from adults, and those accused should be segregated from those convicted. See International
Covenant, supra note 44, art. 10; American Convention, supra note 44, arts. 5(3), 5(4). Most
of the constitutions in the first group omit this right all together. See supra note 61 and
accompanying text. Paraguay's Constitution not only includes this right but echoes the
international instruments-also demanding that juveniles and adults, as well as the accused and
the convicted, should be separated. See CONST. PARA. art. 21.
The American Convention provides generically that no one shall be imprisoned for
failure to pay a debt, yet further specifies that this provision does not apply for orders issued for
"nonfulfillment of duties of support." See American Convention, supra note 44, art. 7(7).
Brazil similarly draws an exception to the general rule for "defaults on an alimony obligation."
CONST. BRAZ. art. 5(LXVII).
82. See supra note 71 and Table 2 in the Appendix for the international instruments'
treatment of criminal defense rights. In Paraguay's Constitution, the "personal liberty and
security" provision, covering arrest procedures, provides for all the rights granted in
international treaties but also explicitly grants criminal defendants the right to have family
members or other designated individuals informed of the arrest; the right to engage an
interpreter as soon as the detention begins; and the right to remain silent. See CONST. PARA.
arts. 12(2), 12(4), 12(1). Paraguay's criminal defense rights, covering the trial itself, are also
significantly enhanced, including the right to have copies of all relevant documents; the right
"to offer, produce, check, and reject evidence"; and the right "to have the court dismiss any
evidence produced or proceedings carried out in violations of legal provisions." CONST. PARA.
arts. 17(7), 17(8), 17(9). Brazil's Constitution also expands criminal defense rights: the arrest
and place of detention shall be communicated to the detainee's family; the accused has the right
to remain silent; the right to ajury; and illegal evidence will not be used in trial. See CONST.
BRAZ. arts. 5(LXII), 5(LXIII), 5(XXXVIII), 5(LVI). Colombia's Constitution explicitly forbids
use of illegally obtained evidence. See CONST. COLOM. art. 29.
83. The International Covenant and the American Convention set forth a basic right to
freedom of association, including the right to join trade unions; but carve exceptions to this
right in the name of "national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public
health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedom of others"; and state that
governments may lawfully restrict members of the armed forces and police in their exercise of
this right. International Covenant, supra note 44, art. 22; American Convention, supra note 44,
art. 16. The Brazilian Constitution provides for the following: "freedom of association for
lawful purposes is complete, but any paramilitary association is prohibited"; "creation of
associations and, as set forth in law, of cooperatives, requires no authorization, prohibiting state
interference in their operations"; "associations may be compulsorily dissolved or have their
activities suspended only by court decision; in the former case a final and unappealable decision
is required"; and "no one can be compelled to join an association or to remain in one." CONST.
BRAZ. arts. 5(XVII), 5(XVIII), 5(XIX), 5(XX). See also CONST. COLOM. arts. 38-39.
84. The international instruments provide for humane treatment ofprisoners by mandating
segregation of different groups of prisoners. See International Covenant, supra note 44, art. 10;
American Convention, supra note 44, arts. 5(3), 5(4). The Brazilian Constitution enhances this
right by providing for segregation with regard to age, sex, and criminal offense and further
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because they are affirmative, creating state obligations.85 Some consti-
tutional rights are stronger because they eliminate encroaching
16exceptions.
When substantive treatment of human rights norms is a
comparative axis, constitutions split into two groups. However, these
groups share two traits. First, international human rights treaties clearly
provided a foundation-some type of model-for constitutional
providing that "female prisoners shall be assured conditions that allow them to remain with their
children during the period of breast-feeding." CONST. BRAz. arts. 5(XLVIII), 5(L).
Colombia's equal protection clause extends protection beyond the delineated categories
to "those individuals who on account of their economic, physical, or mental condition are in
obviously vulnerable circumstances." CONST. COLOM. art. 13.
85. For example, Paraguay's Constitution not only assures equality to "all residents as far
as dignity and rights are concerned" (CONST. PARA. art. 46) and makes explicit equality
assurances to men and women (see id. art. 48), but also creates potent, affirmative state duties:
"The State will remove all obstacles and prevent those factors that support or promote
discrimination," (id. art. 46); "The State will create conditions conducive to, and will create
adequate mechanisms for, making this equality true and effective by removing those obstacles
that could prevent or curtail this equality as well as by promoting women's participation in
every sector of national life." (id. art. 48). While the International Covenant and the American
Convention also impose obligations upon States Parties to assure that all persons have "free and
full exercise" of rights in a non-discriminatory manner, the obligations imposed by Paraguay's
Constitution are much more robust, requiring not only removal of obstacles impeding equality
but also prevention of those factors that support or promote discrimination. See International
Covenant, supra note 44, art. 2; American Convention, supra note 44, art. 1.
86. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text. The Constitution of Colombia does
not allow suspension of any "human rights" or "fundamental freedoms" and provides that "[i]n
all cases, the rules of international humanitarian law will be observed." CONST. COLOM. art. 214.
The international instruments' freedom of speech, religion, and association/assembly
rights contain a strong exception: they may be restricted in the name of national security, public
safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals, and in respect of the rights or
reputations of others. See International Covenant, supra note 44, art. 18 (religion and
conscience, excluding national security), art. 19 (expression and opinions), art. 21 (assembly);
art. 22 (association). See also American Convention, supra note 44, art. 12 (conscience and
religion, excluding reputation and national security), art. 13 (thought and expression), arts. 15,
16 (assembly and association, excluding reputation). However, the Constitution of Paraguay
does not carve such exceptions for some of these rights, and for others it narrows the scope of
the exception, thereby enhancing the breadth of the right. Article 26, concerning "freedom of
expression and the press," does not carve any exceptions. CONST. PARA. art. 26. The right to
assembly, Article 32, only carves exceptions in "areas of public traffic control, at certain hours,
to preserve public order and the rights of others." Id. art. 32. Similarly, the Constitution of
Brazil merely excepts meetings which "interfere with another meeting previously called for the
same place" from its general freedom of assembly clause. "[P]rior notice to the proper
authority" is an additional prerequisite to freedom of assembly. CONST. BRAz. art. 5(XVI).
Similarly, Brazil's freedom of association provisions do not carve out the same type of
expansive exceptions, merely prohibiting "paramilitary association." Id. arts. 5(XVII-XX). The
Colombian Constitution does not load its freedom of conscience, religion, and association
provisions with restrictive exceptions. See CONST. COLOM. arts. 18, 19, 38-39. The
Constitution of Ecuador does not place restrictions on the freedom of assembly or the freedom
of association and limits exceptions for the freedom of opinion and expression provision by
providing "[a]ny person who was affected by inaccurate statements or whose honor injured by
the press or other means of social communication will have the right to have the corresponding
rectification made by them free of charge." CONsT. ECUADOR arts. 19(13), 31(h), 19(4).
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development of individual rights.87 Second, no constitution, not even
those in the second group, contains all of the rights delineated in the
international treaties. Those constitutions that incorporated most rights
did not consistently emulate the scope and breadth of such rights, opting
to curtail some rights while enhancing others. One can only speculate
regarding the constitutional drafters' frame of mind at the inception of
these constitutions. It is reasonable, however, to imagine a deliberative
process that resulted in the inclusion of some rights, at the expense of
others, as well as an attenuation of the scope of certain rights.
2. Constitutional Status of Human Rights Norms
Many modem constitutions address the status of international
human rights norms or, more generally, international law.88 As in the
previous section, this Article will focus on South American
constitutions, and suggests the following broad groupings: 1)
constitutions which place international treaties on a par with domestic
law; 2) constitutions that deem international treaties superior to
domestic law but inferior to the constitution; and 3) constitutions that
do not explicitly (or implicitly) address the status of international law.
87. See, e.g., A.E. Dick Howard, The Indeterminacy of Constitutions, 31 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 383,387 (1996).
88. For a comprehensive survey of the constitutional treatment of international treaties,
see Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and
International Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 287, 355 (1996) (Annex I: Constitutional
Provisions Referring to the Status of International Law, Including References to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights).
While beyond the scope of this Article, the constitutional status of human rights treaties,
principally the European Convention on Human Rights, has been a significant aspect of
constitutional reform efforts in Central and Eastern Europe. See European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, openedfor signature Nov. 4, 1950,
Europ. T.S. No. 5,213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 5, 1953). See also Howard, supra
note 87, at387-88; Eric Stein, International Law in Internal Law: Toward Internationalization
of Central-Eastern European Constitutions?, 88 AM. J. INT'LL.427 (1994); Wiktor Osiatynski,
Rights in New Constitutions of East Central Europe, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 111, 161
(1994); Dalibor Jilek, Human Rights Treaties and the New Constitutions, 8 CONN. J. INT'L L.
407 (1993).
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The following table sets forth the relevant constitutional
provisions.
Table 1: South American Constitutions and the Status of International
Law
Country Constitutional Provisions
Bolivia Art. 228: The Constitution of the State is the supreme law of the
(1967; national juridical system. The courts, judges, and authorities shall
1995 amend.) apply it with preference over the laws, and the laws with preference
over any other resolutions.
Art. 96(2): The powers and duties of the President of the Republic
are ... to negotiate and conclude treaties with foreign nations; and to
exchange them when ratified by Congress.
Art. 59(12): The following are the functions of the legislative power.
.. to approve international treaties, concordats and conventions.
Brazil Art. 4: The international relations of the Federative Republic of
(1988) Brazil are governed by the following principles: ... prevalence of
human rights.
Art. 49 (I): The National Congress shall have exclusive powers to
decide definitively on international treaties, accords or acts that
involve serious changes or commitments on the national patrimony.
Art. 84(VIII): The President of Brazil has the exclusive power to ...
enter into international treaties, conventions and acts, subject to the
approval of Congress.
Chile Art. 5: It is the duty of state agencies to respect and promote the
(1980; rights guaranteed by this Constitution and by international treaties
1989 amend.) ratified by Chile and in force.
Art. 32(17):[ The President has the power to sign and ratify treaties,
but they] must be submitted to the approval of Congress as
prescribed for in Article 50, No. 1.
Art. 50(1): The exclusive powers of Congress are: to approve or
reject international treaties submitted by the President of the
Republic prior to ratification thereof. The approval of a treaty shall
be subject to the procedures prescribed by a law. The measures
which the President of the Republic adopts or the agreements
concluded by him or the fulfilment of a treaty in force shall not
require new approval by the Congress, except in cases which
constitute a matter of law.
Colombia Art. 93: International treaties and agreements ratified by the
(1991) Congress that recognize human rights and that prohibit their
limitation in states of emergency have priority domestically. The
rights and duties mentioned in this Charter will be interpreted in
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Art. 2: The primary function of the State is to strengthen national
unity, ensure the effectiveness of fundamental human rights.
Art. 44: The State guarantees to all individuals, male and female,
who are subject to its jurisdiction, free and effective exercise and
enjoyment of the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights
enunciated in declarations, pacts, agreements and other international
instruments in force.
Art. 137: The Constitution is the supreme law of the land ....
Secondary norms and others of lesser importance must maintain
conformity with constitutional precepts. Laws, decrees, ordinances,
provincial, and international treaties or agreements that oppose the
Constitution or modify its precepts in any way shall be void.
Art. 137: The Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic. The
Constitution, the international treaties, conventions, and agreements
that have been approved and ratified by Congress, the laws dictated
by Congress, and other related legal provisions of lesser rank make
up the national legal system. This listing reflects the descending
order of preeminence.
Article 141: International treaties that were properly concluded and
approved by a law of Congress and the instruments of ratification
which have been exchanged or deposited are part of the domestic
legal system in keeping with the order of preeminence established
under Article 137.
Article 142: International treaties concerning human rights cannot be
renounced, but must follow the procedure established herein for the
amendment of this Constitution.
Article 143: In its international relations, the Republic of Paraguay
accepts international law and endorses the following principles: ...
5) International human rights.
Art. 55: Treaties signed by the State and in force are part of national
law.
Art. 56: Treaties must be approved by the Congress before their
ratification by the President of the Republic if they involve the
following matters: 1) human rights; 2) sovereignty, dominion, or
integrity of the State ....
Art. 57: The President of the Republic may accept or ratify treaties
without need for the prior approval of the Congress in matters not
covered in the previous article. In all these cases, he must render an
accounting to the Congress. When the treaty affects constitutional
provisions, it must be approved by the same procedure that applies to
amending the Constitution before being ratified by the President of
the Republic. The denunciation of treaties falls under the authority
of the President of the Republic who is responsible for rendering
account to the Congress. In the case of treaties subject to the
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Uruguay Art. 85(7): The General Assembly is competent.., to declare war
(1967; and to approve or disapprove, by an absolute majority of the full
reinstated 1995) membership of both chambers, the treaties of peace, alliance,
commerce and conventions or contracts of any nature which the
Executive Power may make with foreign powers.
Art. 85(20): The Executive shall ... conclude and sign treaties, the
approval of the Legislative Power being necessary to their
ratification.
Venezuela Art. 128: International treaties or conventions conducted by the
(1961) National Executive must be approved by'a special law in order to be
valid, unless they concern the execution or completion of pre-
existing obligations of the Republic, the application of principles
expressed by it, the execution of ordinary acts in international
relations, or the exercise of powers which the law expressly bestows
on the National Executive.
The constitutions which place international law on a par with
domestic law expose international norms to subsequent statutory
invalidation.89 International treaty norms thus become vulnerable and
manipulable, depending on the sentiments and mood of transient
legislatures. The Peruvian Constitution clearly states that treaties are a
part of "national law."'  The Venezuelan Constitution requires the
legislature to pass laws validating all international treaties or
conventions, relegating these international norms to the status of a
domestic law.9 Other constitutions do not explicitly address the status
of international law, but divide power over international treaties among
the executive, who concludes treaties, and the legislative branch, which
ratifies treaties. Domestic constitutional law interpreting these
provisions frequently relegates international treaties to the status of a
domestic statute.92
89. In United States jurisprudence, this is known as the "last-in-time" rule. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 115(1), (2).
90. CONST. PERU art. 55. See also Table I supra.
91. See CONST. VENEZ. art. 128; Table 1 supra. Venezuela has determined, via its
Constitution, that, for the most part, treaties will be non-self-executing, requiring domestic
facilitating legislation prior to having legal effect. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, §§
111(3), 111(4). Most commentators believe that non-self-executing treaties, once executed, are
tantamount to domestic statutes. See id. § 11, cmts. (h), (i), reporter's notes 5, 6. See also
H6ctor Gros Espiell, Los Tratados sobre Derechos Humanos y el Derecho Interno in TEMAS
DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL: EN HOMENAJE A FRIDA M. PFIERTER DE ARMAS BAREA 61, 63
(R.E. Vineusa ed., 1989); M6NICA PINTO, TEMAS DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 66 (1997) (stating
that Venezuela's Constitution places international norms on a par with domestic law).
92. See CONST. URU. arts. 85(7), 85(20). See also Table 1 supra; H6ctor Gros Espiell,
La Constituci6n y los Tratados Internacionales (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores,
Montevideo, 1997) (discussing Uruguayan constitutional jurisprudence interpreting these
provisions and concluding that international law and domestic law share the same legal status);
PINTO, supra note 91, at 66 (stating that Uruguay's Constitution places international norms on
a par with domestic law). See also CONST. BOL. arts. 59(12); 96(2); 228; PINTO, supra note 91,
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On the other hand, some constitutions explicitly elevate
international norms, or a specific group of international norms.
Paraguay's Constitution ranks sources of law, with international treaties
and conventions falling below its Constitution but above "laws dictated
by Congress." 93 Colombia's Constitution elevates international treaties
that "recognize human rights and that prohibit their limitation in states
of emergency." 94 Ecuador's Constitution is not explicit in its treatment
of international human rights norms; it sanctifies "fundamental human
rights"95 and guarantees "free and effective exercise and enjoyment of
the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights enunciated in
declarations, pacts, agreements and other international instruments in
force,"'96 while it relegates international treaties or agreements to the
status of a "secondary" or non-constitutional norm.97 Juxtaposing these
constitutional provisions, one can logically conclude that international
treaty norms float somewhere between the Constitution and domestic
law in Ecuador's domestic legal hierarchy.
Other constitutions leave the status of international norms
ambiguous. Chile's Constitution, for example, mimics the
constitutional division of power among the executive and the legislative
branches found in the Uruguayan and Bolivian Constitutions, 98
suggesting that international norms would be on a par with domestic
norms. Yet, a relatively recent amendment to Chile's Constitution
charges state agencies with the duty "to respect and promote the rights
guaranteed" in international treaties, 99 suggesting that such norms are
cloaked with special domestic standing. Thus, Chile's Constitution is
rather ambiguous regarding the precise status of international norms."°
The legal status of international treaties and conventions provides
an additional axis for comparison of South American constitutions.
Whether constitutions place international norms on a par with domestic
law, above domestic law, or leave the issue unresolved, none of these
at 66 (arguing that Bolivia's Constitution places international norms on a par with domestic
law).
93. CONST. PARA. art. 137. See also Table I supra; PINTO, supra note 91, at 64-65.
94. CONST. COLOM. art. 93. See also Table 1 supra; PINTO, supra note 91, at 69.
95. CONST. ECUADOR art. 2. See also Table I supra.
96. CONST. ECUADOR art. 44.
97. See id. art. 137.
98. See Table 1 supra.
99. CONST. CHILE art. 5. See also Table I supra.
100. See PINTO, supra note 91, at 69-70 (arguing that Chile's Constitution is ambiguous
with regard to the status of international human rights norms).
Brazil's Constitution is similarly ambiguous. On one hand, the Brazilian Constitution
lauds its commitment to human rights in its opening articles. See CONST. BRAZ. art. 4 (1988).
On the other hand, it mirrors those constitutions which mechanically divide power among the
executive and legislative branches. See id. arts. 49(I), 84(VIII); Table 1 supra; Espiell, supra
note 91, at 63.
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constitutions explicitly or implicitly place international law on par with
the constitution itself. 01
C. Argentina's Constitution In Context: Pre-1994
The previous section develops two axes upon which constitutions
may be compared vis-A-vis international human rights. In terms of
substance, some constitutions incorporate the skeletal spirit of
international human rights treaties, while others incorporate their
nuances and breadth. In terms of status, some constitutions place
international treaties on a par with domestic law, while others anoint
international norms with a status superior to domestic law. Argentina's
1994 constitutional reforms dramatically changed where its Constitution
falls on these two axes.
1. Constitutional Status of Human Rights
Prior to 1994, Argentina's Constitution did not explicitly address
the status of international treaties. Similar to the Uruguayan, Brazilian
and Bolivian Constitutions,2 Argentina's Constitution divided power
over international treaties among the three branches. 03  The
Constitution also stated in Article 31 that the Constitution, the laws that
are passed by Congress pursuant to the Constitution, and treaties with
foreign powers are the supreme law of the land; and that provincial
authorities are obliged to conform to this law °4  suggesting some type
of parity between the Constitution and international treaties. On the
other hand, the Constitution provided in Article 27 that "[t]he federal
government will be charged with relations with foreign powers, through
101. See PINTO, supra note 91, at 66; Espiell, supra note 91, at 64.
While none of the South American constitutions place international norms on par with
constitutional norms, some European constitutions arguably elevate international norms to a
constitutional status. Id. at 64-65. See also supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text; CONST.
CZECH REP. art. 10 (Dec. 21, 1992)("Ratified and promulgated international treaties on human
rights and fundamental freedoms to which the Czech Republic is a party are directly binding and
take precedence over the law"); CONST. SLOVK. art. 1 (Sept. 8, 1992) ("International treaties on
human rights and basic liberties that were ratified by the Slovakia and promulgated in a manner
determined by law take precedence over its own laws, providing that they secure a greater extent
of constitutional rights and liberties"); CONST. HUNG. art. 7 (Dec. 31, 1990) ("The legal system
of the Republic of Hungary accepts the universally recognized rules and regulations of
international law, and harmonizes the internal laws and statutes of the country with the
obligations assumed under international law."). Constitutional jurisprudence in some Central
American countries, namely Nicaragua, Panama, and Costa Rica, suggests that some
international norms may have constitutional standing. See INSTrrUTO INTERAMERICANO DE
DERECHOS HUMANOS, GUIA SOBRE APLICACI6N DEL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL EN LA
JURISDICCION INTERNA 42 (1996).
102. See supra notes 92 & 105 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
104. See CONST. ARG. (1853) art. 31.
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treaties that are in conformity with the public principles that are set forth
in this Constitution,"' 5 implying that international norms stand inferior
to the Constitution. While many commentators interpreted Article 31
through a federalist lens, focusing on what it stated about
province/federal government relations rather than what it stated about
the status of international treaties vis-a-vis the Constitution,"° the
juxtaposition of these various provisions created some ambiguity
regarding the precise status of international norms.° 7
Argentine constitutional jurisprudence resolved some of this
ambiguity prior to the 1994 constitutional reform. The most significant
case was Ekmekdjidn v. Sofovich.0 8 In this case, the petitioner sought
to respond to some religiously "inflammatory" statements that the
respondent read on television.0 9 In support, the petitioner relied on the
"right to reply" found in the American Convention. 0 Yet, domestic
law also governed the "right to reply." In ultimately relying on the
American Convention, the Court decided that an international treaty,
properly ratified pursuant to the Constitution,"' stands superior to
105. Id. art. 27.
106. See PINTO, supra note 91, at 65 (discussing Article 31 and comparing it to similar
language in the U.S. Constitution, which sets forth the preeminence of federal law in the legal
hierarchy); Espiell, supra note 91, at 62.
107. See Marisa A. Graham & Juan P. Cafiero, Tratados sobre Derechos Humanos, in
JERARQUiACONSTITUCIONALDE LOS TRATADOS INTERNACIONALES, supra note 38, at 27,28-31.
Many of the members of the Constitutional Assembly discussed this ambiguity. See
PROYECTOS INGRESADOS No. 3, CONVENCION NACIONAL CONST1TUYENTE [Record of
Constitutional Assembly] [hereinafter REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY], June 14, 1994, 10:00 P.M., at
547 (statement of Horacio Rosatti) (discussing the ambiguity that Article 31 creates); REC.
CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 19, June 17, 1994, 11:00 A.M., at 786 (statement of Guillermo E.
Estevez Boero, Alfredo P. Bravo & Norberto L. La Porta) (same); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No.
22, June 22, 1994, 1:00 P.M., at 888 (statement ofAugusto J.M. Alasino) (same); REC. CONST.
ASSEMBLY No. 24, June 22, 1994, 5:00 P.M., at 1013 (statement of Alberto A. Natale, Pablo
A. Cardinale & Carlos A. Caballero Martfn) (same); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 26, June 23,
1994, 1:30 P.M., at 1255 (statement of Juan C. Hitters) (discussing the conflict between Articles
27 and 3 1); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 35, June 24, 1994, 5:30 P.M., at 1975 (statement of
Alberto E. Balestrini) (discussing the tension between Articles 27 and 31 and the disparate
views of the status of international treaties and conventions vis-h-vis the Constitution).
108. "Ekmekdjid.n," CSJN (1992), reprinted in JUAN ANTONIOTRAVIESO, JURISPRUDENCIA
DE LOS TRIBUNALES ARGENTINOS SOBRE DERECHOS HUMANOS Y GARANTIAS 11 (1996)
(concerning right to reply and freedom of speech) (translations of the case are by the Author).
109. Id. at 11.
110. See id. at 11. See also American Convention, supra note 44, art. 14(1) ("Anyone
injured by inaccurate or offensive statements or ideas disseminated to the public in general by
a legally regulated medium of communication has the right to reply or to make a correction
using the same communications outlet, under such conditions as the law may establish.").
111. CONST. ARG. (1853) art. 86(14) (Executive concludes and signs treaties), art. 67(19)"
(Congress approves treaties).
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domestic law.1 2 Thus, as opposed to the practice in the United States, " 3
a subsequent domestic law could not trump an international treaty
provision, and Argentine domestic law could not constrict the scope or
efficacy of international treaty provisions." 4 Furthermore, the Court
concluded that an international treaty provision, properly ratified, is
presumptively self-executing" 5 as long as it is capable of "immediate
operation, without additional institutions."" 6 Thus, Ekmekdjidn placed
international treaties on a supra-statutory level and, by holding that they
were presumptively self-executing documents, transformed them into
a potent source of law which the Court itself harnessed to decide the
case.
However, two subsequent Supreme Court opinions limited the
reach of Ekmekdjidn. In Fibraca, the Court examined a potential
conflict between a treaty with the Holy See and the Constitution.' '7 The
Court refused to extend the holding of Ekmekdjidn to the Constitution,
stating that international treaties' supra-statutory status did not place
them on a par with the Constitution." 8 The Court thereby underscored
that the Constitution reigned supreme in the legal hierarchy. In
Hagelin,"9 the lower court relied on the American Convention in
granting the plaintiff indemnification for his daughter's illegal detention
and subsequent disappearance, rather than a domestic indemnification
law designed primarily as a remedy in light of Argentina's economic
problems in the late 1980s.12 While the Court reaffirmed the
supremacy of international law over domestic law, it held that the
former trumps the latter only in the face of a real legal conflict, such that
the conflicting laws must be significantly, if not completely, congruent
and the underlying purposes behind the laws must be similar.'2' Thus,
if a domestic law is designed to deal with a specific problem, as the
indemnification law in question, and an international norm deals more
generically with a similar issue, the international norm is not deemed to
112. See Graham & Cafiero, supra note 107, at 28 (citing several lower court cases that
support the legal conclusions in Ekmekdjidn).
113. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing the last-in-time rule in the
United States).
114. See "Cafes ]a Virginia S.A.," CSJN [1995-I] J.A. 686 (holding that any administrative
action in violation of international treaties violates the supremacy of those treaties over internal
law).
115. See supra note 35 (discussing self-executing treaties).
116. "Ekmekdjidn," CSJN (1992), at 16.
117. See "Fibraca Constructora, S.C.A.," CSJN 154 E.D. 164, 165 (1993).
118. See id. at 165.
119. "Hagelin, Ragnar," CSJN (1993), reprinted in TRAVIESO, supra note 108, at 37.
120. See id. at 37-38. See also American Convention, supra note 44, art. 5(1) ("Every
person has the right to have his physical, mental, and moral integrity respected.").
121. See "Hagelin," CSJN (1993) at 39.
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be in conflict and may not trump the domestic norm.'22 On the eve of
the constitutional reform, Argentina's Constitution could be aligned
with those constitutions that place international law somewhere between
domestic law and constitutional norms.
2. Substantive Treatment of Human Rights
As far as substantive treatment of human rights, Argentina's pre-
1994 Constitution was similar to those constitutions which are mere
skeletal reflections of international human rights norms. 23 Admittedly,
the core of Argentina's Constitution pre-dated the advent of
international human rights; however, the last two constitutional
amendments (1949 and 1957) 124 followed the United Nation's
embracing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 25 and could
have provided an ample and meaningful opportunity for substantive
incorporation of human rights norms.
Argentina's pre- 1994 Constitution 126 was "missing" several rights,
most notably an equal protection-type clause, 127 a prohibition on
imprisonment for debts, 28 the right to peaceful assembly, 129 and
family/children's rights. 3 Of the fifteen rights that Argentina shared
with the international instruments, twelve were rather minimal,
mimicking only the spirit of international norms rather than their scope
or depth. 3' In addition, Argentina's pre-1994 "state of emergency"
provisions are classically expansive, providing the executive relatively
unconstrained power to suspend constitutional guarantees in the face of
an "internal disorder."' 32
122. See id.
123. See supra notes 56-81 and accompanying text.
124. See CONST. ARG. (amended 1949 and 1979).
125. See Universal Declaration, supra note 44.
126. See also Table 2: Argentina's Constitutional Treatment of Human Rights: Past and
Present, in the Appendix, which compares Argentina's pre-1994 and post-1994 Constitutions
in terms of human rights.
127. See International Covenant, supra note 44, art. 3; American Convention, supra note
44, art. 24.
128. See International Covenant, supra note 44, art. 11; American Convention, supra note
44, art. 7(7).
129. See International Covenant, supra note 44, art. 21; American Convention, supra note
44, art. 15.
130. See International Covenant, supra note 44, arts. 23-24; American Convention, supra
note 44, arts. 17(5), 18-20.
131. Table 2 indicates that Argentina shares nineteen rights with the International Covenant
and the American Convention. Table 2 also indicates with a "-" sign that eleven of these
rights are significantly less robust than their treaty counterparts.
132. CONST. ARG. (1853) arts. 23-29.
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D. Argentina's 1994 Constitution
Argentina's 1994 constitutional reform altered the Constitution's
standing in terms of status and substance. Article 75(22) endowed nine
international human rights treaties with constitutional standing, 133 and
otherwise reaffirmed the Supreme Court's decisions"3 by providing all
other international treaties with supra-statutory standing. 135  Thus,
domestic law cannot trump an international norm, and certain
international human rights norms, to be interpreted in harmony with the
rest of the 1994 Constitution, 136 stand on par with the Constitution itself.
In terms of substance, it is important first to examine Argentina's
new Constitution independent of Article 75(22), as set forth in the final
column of Table 2 in the Appendix. Without Article 75(22),
Argentina's Constitution remains highly reminiscent of its predecessor
and similar to those constitutions that reflect the spirit, rather than the
scope, of human rights treaties. 37  Significantly, in reforming the
Constitution in 1994, Argentina left Chapter 1, "Declaration, Rights,
Guarantees," almost untouched. 38  Chapter 2, "New Rights and
Guarantees," a fresh addition to the 1994 Constitution, presented
Argentina with the opportunity to "update" many rights, adding nuances
to make its constitutional rights as robust as those in the international
documents. Chapter 2, however, only nominally improved Argentina's
substantive inclusion of human rights as set forth in the American
Convention and International Covenant. The Constitution now provides
explicitly for "equality of opportunity and treatment and the full exercise
of rights recognized in this Constitution"; 139 "real equality of
opportunity between men and women in accessing elected and party
133. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 108-22 and accompanying text (discussing recent Argentine Supreme
Court decisions regarding status of international law).
135. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. See infra note 242 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 55-78 and accompanying text.
138. Chapter 1 of the 1994 Constitution is identical to its 1853 predecessor. With the
exception of some relatively minor changes in Article 22 (regarding the nature of representative
government) and some mildly limiting language in the "state of emergency" provision
("Congress may not confer on the National Executive, nor the Provincial Legislatures or the
Provincial Governors extraordinary powers, nor the whole of the public authority, nor grant
them acts of submission or supremacy whereby the lives, honor or the property of Argentineans
will be at the mercy of governments or any person whatsoever"), CONST. ARG. (1994) arts. 22,
29 (underlined language indicates 1994 amendments). See also Table 2 in the Appendix which
shows that those rights which were "missing" from the pre-1994 Constitution are generally
missing from the post-1994 Constitution.
139. CONST. ARG. (1994) art. 75(23). See also International Covenant, supra note 44, art.
2; American Convention, supra note 44 art. 1.
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office"; 40 habeas corpus;' ethnic and religious minority rights;'42 and
somewhat veiled allusions to children's rights.'43 In addition, Chapter
2 begins with a reaffirmation of the Constitution and the democratic
system.'" Otherwise, Chapter 2 differs from the type of fundamental
rights included in the International Covenant and the American
Convention, addressing instead political corruption,145  political
parties, 146 environmental rights, 147 and consumer protection. 14, While
these aforementioned rights, if implemented, will significantly improve
the human rights situation in Argentina, Argentina's Constitution still
lacks explicit reference to many rights, most notably, the right to
peaceful assembly 149 and protection from imprisonment for debts. 50
The Argentine Constitutional Assembly also failed to embrace the
constitutional reform process as an opportunity to fortify those bare-
bones rights which the 1853 Constitution listed. Protections for
criminal defendants remain scant;' 5' with the exception of the added
140. CONsT.ARG. (1994) art. 37 ('This Constitution guarantees full enjoyment of political
rights, in accordance with the principle of popular sovereignty and with laws dictated pursuant
thereto. Suffrage is universal, equal, secret, and mandatory. Real equality of opportunity
between men and women in accessing elected and party office is guaranteed through positive
actions in the regulation of political parties and in the electoral system."). See also International
Covenant, supra note 44, arts. 3, 25; American Convention, supra note 44 arts. 23-24.
141. See CONST. ARG. (1994) art. 43 ("When the right which has been harmed, restricted,
altered, or threatened related to physical liberty or to a case of illegal worsening in the form or
conditions of detention, or in the forced disappearance of persons, the writ of habeas corpus
may be imposed by the affected person or by someone else to benefit him; the judge is to
resolve the issue immediately, even while there is a state of siege."). Article 43 also provides
for an amparo, which is a "quick, expedient action to protect himself, as long as no other more
appropriate judicial means exist, against any act or omission of public authorities or any
individuals, who actually or imminently, harm, restrict, alter or threaten rights and guarantees
recognized by this Constitution." Id. See International Covenant, supra note 44, art. 9;
American Convention, supra note 44 art. 7(1-6).
142. See CONsT. ARG. (1994) art. 75(17) ("Congress shall have the power... [t]o recognize
the ethnic and cultural pre-existence of indigenous Argentinean peoples."). See also
International Covenant, supra note 44, art. 27.
143. See CONST. ARG. art. 75(23) ("Congress shall have the power... [t]o legislate and
promote means of positive action that guarantee.., the rights of children [and] women.").
144. See id. art. 36 ("This Constitution remains in power even when its observance is
interrupted by acts of force against the institutional order and the democratic system. These acts
are irredeemably null .... ).
145. See id. ("Congress shall pass a law concerning public ethics for the exercise of that
function .... ).
146. See id. art. 38.
147. See id. art. 41.
148. See id. art. 42.
149. See International Covenant, supra note 44, art. 21; American Convention, supra note
44, art. 15.
150. See International Covenant, supra note 44, art. 11; American Convention, supra note
44, art. 7(7).
151. See CONST. ARG. (1994), art. 18. See also International Covenant, supra note 44, art.
14; American Convention, supra note 44, art. 8.
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habeas corpus fights, the provisions for liberty and security of the
person are thin; 52 and freedom of expression and religion clauses are
generally narrower in scope than international counterparts. 5 3 In sum,
of the nineteen rights that Argentina's Constitution now shares with the
international instruments, eleven are significantly less "muscular" than
the international norms, without the nuances, subtleties, and refinements
included in the international instruments.'54 The "state of emergency"
clause, which, despite being the target of constitutional reform, does not
circumscribe the number or types of rights that may be suspended,
potentially undermines the potency and scope of all constitutional
protections.55 Thus, Argentina's Constitution would have remained in
first group of constitutions in terms of substance.
Now consider the effect of Article 75(22). The Argentine
Constitution is no longer a succinct document containing 110
constitutional provisions but rather a compendium of the constitutional
text and the nine human rights treaties which, by virtue of their
constitutional status, are effectively incorporated into the constitutional
text. Therefore, every right, every privilege, every guarantee, that the
anointed human rights treaties grant are part of Argentina's
Constitution. Whereas some constitutions merely incorporate the spirit
of human rights treaties'56 and others more accurately reflect their scope
and breadth,'57 Argentina's Constitution takes a further step: wholesale
incorporation of the treaties themselves. The Constitution now mirrors
these select human rights treaties, identical in scope, form, and
substance. In this sense, Argentina's actions are unique in South
America and, arguably, the world. The 1994 constitutional reforms thus
forced a shift along both comparative axes, substance and status, leaving
the Argentine Constitution unparalleled in South America.
152. See CONST.ARG. (1994), arts. 18,43. See also International Covenant, supra note 44,
art. 9; American Convention, supra note 44, art. 7(1-6).
153. See CONST. ARG. (1994), art. 14. See also International Covenant, supra note 44, art.
18; American Convention, supra note 44, art. 12.
154. See Table 2 in the Appendix. A comparison of Columns I and 2 with Column 4 shows
that the Argentine Constitution shares nineteen rights with the international instruments. Of
these nineteen rights, eleven have"-" signs indicating that they are less expansive than their
international counterparts.
155. See CONST. ARG. (1994), arts. 23,29. See also International Covenant, supra note 44,
art. 4; American Convention, supra note 44, art. 8.
156. See supra notes 55-78 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
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IV. ASSESSING THE INTERNALIZATION STRATEGY: A SCOREBOARD
Some human rights advocates laud Argentina's constitution-
alization of human rights treaties as a bold step worthy of emulation. 5
On the "ground," however, Argentina's internalization experiment is
nascent and virtually invisible. The Argentine government continues to
violate human rights;'59 most lawyers have yet to unleash their new
Constitution's potential; and the average individual is so skeptical of
law and the possibility for law to vindicate any individual rights, let
alone a new international human rights template, that the potential
beneficiaries remain relatively ignorant of the constitutional changes.
While Argentina internalized international law on paper, the nation
clearly does not yet obey, let alone comply with, international human
rights law."6
Why has this internalization strategy been largely ineffective? The
answer lies, in great part, in transnational legal process theory, more
specifically, with the transnational actors that drive transnational legal
process. Transnational actors constitute and reconstitute interests,
acting as antennae that reach into the depths of society, prodding
corporal transformation. It is only logical that the number of
transnational actors, or antennae, bears a direct relationship to the
effectiveness of internalization strategies. Successful internalization
158. In particular, the Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (Center for Legal and Social
Studies, or "CELS"), a leading Argentine human rights advocacy group, argues that Article
75(22) is a panacea to Argentina's human rights difficulties. See Interview with Martin Abregii,
Director of CELS, in Buenos Aires, Arg. (June 24, 1997). See also infra notes 252-76 and
accompanying text. In a series of lectures in June 1997, human rights advocates applauded the
constitutionalization of human rights treaties. See Marcela Rodriguez, Woman's Rights
Activist, Lecture to Summer Institute in International Law at Universidad de Palermo, Buenos
Aires, Arg. (June 24, 1997) (describing Article 75(22) as a "good tool" for human rights
activists); Rafil Alfonsin, Former President of Argentina, Lecture to Summer Institute in
International Law at Universidad de Palermo, Buenos Aires, Arg. (June 25, 1997) (describing
Article 75(22) as an "important" and "big step" and further describing Argentina's 1994
Constitution as the "Human Rights Constitution").
159. See Argentina: Death and Corruption, ECONOMIST, May 30, 1998, at 34 (discussing
corruption, police brutality, and politicizedjudiciary); Calvin Sims, Argentina's Bereft Mothers:
And Now, a New Wave, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1997, at A4 (discussing the continuation of post-
"dirty war" police violence and killings, and noting the rise in number of police brutality cases
and recent condemnation by the United Nations Human Rights Committee for the continued use
of torture in police stations and prisons, despite Argentina's ratification of the U.N. Convention
Against Torture); War on the Media in Argentina, N.Y.TIMES, Sept. 16, 1997, at A30; Anthony
Faiola, Argentina Still Grappling with Oppressive Past, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1997, at A25
(discussing Argentina's restrictions on press freedom, as well as police, governmental, and
judicial corruption); Ivan Briscoe, Argentine Murder Inquiry Points Finger at Police,
GUARDIAN, Apr. 9, 1997, at 7 (discussing linkage between the police and the Mafia in the
murder of a noted photographer); Jonathan Friedland, Police Give a Black Eye to Buenos Aires,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 1997, at A15 (discussing police corruption).
160. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text for discussion of the distinction between
compliance and obedience.
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strategies-internalization strategies that breed a nation's desire to obey
the law-are driven by the identity, enthusiasm, and relationships
among transnational actors. Synergistic clusters of transnational
actors-or epistemic communities 161-are integral if international law
is to permeate a nation effectively. Thus, a strategy that engages
numerous transnational actors, from social, political and legal spheres,
and that creates mutually reinforcing relationships between actors, is
bound to affect a nation's psyche. Both the problems that Argentina's
internalization strategy faces, and its incipient promises, may be traced
to the extent to which various transnational actors participated in Article
75(22)'s epistemic community.
A. The Problems
1. The Constitutional Assembly: Where Are the Transnational
Actors?
Some commentators argue that robust debate helps embed law in
a nation's psyche. 62 In terms of transnational legal process, select
transnational actors may stimulate discussion about an international
norm, which in turn may spur debate, thereby animating new
transnational actors and, whether intentionally or inadvertently,
propagating an international norm. The Constitutional Assembly
provided a potential focal point for such discourse, and yet several
transnational actors, most notably the human rights community, stood
on the sidelines as the Constitutional Assembly codified Argentina's
internalization strategy. These transnational actors were relatively
disinterested prior to the Constitutional Assembly because the politics
surrounding the Pacto de Olivos contaminated its legitimacy. In
addition, stifling procedures and dynamics during the Constitutional
Assembly effectively excluded these transnational actors, who were
161. See Koh, supra note 7, at 2656; PeterM. Haas, Introduction to Epistemic Communities
andInternationalPolicy Coordination, 46 INT'LORG. 1,3-4 (1992) ("An epistemic community
is a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain
and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area...
. Members of transnational epistemic communities can influence state interests either by
directly identifying them for decision makers or by illuminating the salient dimensions of an
issue from which the decision makers may then deduce their interests. The decision makers in
one state may, in turn, influence the interests and behavior of other states, thereby increasing
the likelihood of convergent state behavior and international policy coordination, informed by
the causal beliefs and policy preferences of the epistemic community."). See also Symposium,
International Law and International Relations Theory: Building Bridges, 86 AM. Soc'Y INT'L
L. PROC. 167, 171 (1992) (remarks by Kenneth Abbott).
162. See generally CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, THE CONSTITUTION OF DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY 144-86 (1996) (discussing the legitimating merit of robust debate of legal,
particularly constitutional, issues in Argentina and citing numerous political scientists who
support his view).
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already skeptical, from engaging in meaningful discourse. As a result,
few transnational actors left the actual Constitutional Assembly with
much energy or enthusiasm regarding Article 75(22).
a. The Constitutional Assembly: the Prologue
The Constitutional Assembly arrived with little fanfare or advance
billing.'63 The newspapers tended to bury stories about the
Constitutional Assembly. Taxi drivers were unaware that the
Constitutional Assembly was occurring. Many lawyers, including those
involved in human rights issues, were skeptical and suspicious of the
Constitutional Assembly and thus greeted its arrival in a nonchalant
fashion.
Because of the fragility of law in Argentina,'" legal reform efforts
are generally regarded with skepticism and caution. Skepticism of the
Constitutional Assembly, however, was justifiably more intense. The
Constitutional Assembly grew out of the Pacto de Olivos,'65 which was
little more than a political bargain: the Radical Party'66 agreed to support
amendments to the Constitution which would allow President Menem
to run for a second term, and, in exchange, the Peronists67 supported
broadening the scope of the reform effort. 168 Thus, the Constitutional
Assembly was tainted with political compromise and bargaining,
leaving many members of the human rights communities doubting
whether the Constitutional Assembly would be a serious forum in which
to broker positive legal changes.
Furthermore, the Pacto de Olivos delineated several issues which
the Constitutional Assembly would definitely address, as well as several
163. Many of the statements contained herein are impressional. The Constitutional
Assembly began on May 25, 1994. I spent August 1994 in Argentina and attended some of the
Constitutional Assembly's proceedings.
164. See NINO, supra note 29, at 47-48 (arguing that Argentina's disregard for the law has
deep historical roots). Forin-depth discussion of reasons for Argentina's lack of respect for the
law, see generally CARLOS SANTIAGONINO, UNPAiS ALMARGENDELALEY53-136 (1992). See
also Andrew Arato, Forms of Constitution Making and Theories of Democracy, 17 CARDOZO
L. REV. 191,199 (1995) ("[I]n Argentina... there is little constitutionalism."); Irwin P. Stotzky,
The Fragile Bloom of Democracy, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 105 (1989).
For general discussion of the weak state of constitutionalism in Latin America, see Keith
S. Rosenn, The Success of Constitutionalism in the United States and Its Failure in Latin
America: An Explanation, 22 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1 (1990); Keith Rosenn, Federalism
in the Americas in Comparative Perspective, 26 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1 (1994). See
also Rohter, supra note 24, at 1.
165. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
166. The Radical Party is the more liberal of the two main parties. At the time, ex-President
Alfonsfn was at its helm. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
167. The Peronist Party is now the more conservative of the two parties. President Menem
is a member of the Peronist Party. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
168. See Vega, supra note 38, at 2-5. As evidence of this political compromise, most of the
topics included in the mandatory list of reforms concern executive powers and the length of the
presidential term. See supra note 40.
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areas which the Constitutional Assembly might address. 69 Human
rights, however, was not on either list. 7 ° In the build-up to the
Constitutional Assembly, there was little reason for the human rights
community to become animated, for human rights were ostensibly
outside the purview of constitutional reform.
b. The Constitutional Assembly Proceedings
During the Constitutional Assembly itself, the absence of human
rights is striking. In the record, I expected to find passionate debate in
support, fueled by the human rights community and the specter of the
military's human rights abuses.' 7 ' Instead, debate was flat and
antiseptic, devoid of substantive discussion of human rights concerns.'72
I attribute this to the procedures and political dynamics of the
Constitutional Assembly which exacerbated the human rights
community's indifference by effectively constricting its discursive
169. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
170. Admittedly, a few of the issues on the "optional" list, supra note 41, tangentially
broached particular human rights norms. For example, one issue on the "optional" list was
habeas corpus and direct constitutional appeals, an area that would potentially bolster criminal
defendant rights. Other issues for review were "indigenous communities" and "preservation of
the environment." The former is a concern of the International Covenant. See International
Covenant, supra note 44, art. 27. The latter is the subject of international treaties. See, e.g.,
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 44, art. 12(2)(b).
However, there was no "human rights committee," where a full panoply of issues could be
discussed, codified, and/or prioritized.
171. See supra note 29 and accompanying text for discussion of human rights abuses during
the military dictatorship.
172. The Constitutional Assembly's limited discussion of the military's human rights
abuses took place in rather guarded, controlled terms. Given the extent and horrific nature of
the human rights abuses, one could imagine impassioned speeches about human rights and the
need to take extraordinary measures to protect them. The Record of the Constitutional
Assembly reveals that very few members even discussed Argentina's human rights record.
Those that did were rather dispassionate in their discussions. See, e.g., REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY
No. 19, June 17, 1994, 11:00 A.M., at 784 (statement of Teresita B. Serrat) (veiled reference
to the military's human rights abuses, while referencing democratic nation's duty to respect
human rights); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 22, June 22, 1994; 1:00 P.M., at 930 (statement of
Mabel G. de Marelli & Mario Dei Castelli) (proposed amendment to include executive oversight
in response to "the historical experience of the Argentine people" that occurs when "the state
does not promote as much respect for human rights"); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 26, June 23,
1994, 1:30 P.M., at 1255 (statement of Juan C. Hitters). Delegates did not delve into the
substance of or reasons for human rights. Instead, they merely stated that human rights were
"important" and that constitutionalization would showcase their import. See, e.g., REC. CONST.
ASSEMBLY No. 16, June 15, 1994, 3:00 P.M., at 611 (statement of Jorge D. Amena, Susana S.
de De Marfa, Marfa C. Allenano & Augusto Acufia); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 19, June 17,
1994, 11:00 A.M., at 784 (statement of Teresita B. Serrat); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 20,
June 21, 1994, 11:00 A.M., at 832 (statement of Marfa Bercoff); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No.
21, June 21, 1994, 6:00 P.M., at 849 (statement of Rodolfo 0. Ponce de Le6n); REC. CONST.
ASSEMBLY No. 21, June 21, 1994, 6:00 P.M., at 861 (statement of Hector J. Carattoli); REC.
CONST. ASSEMBLYNO. 31, June 24, 1994, 12:00 P.M., at 1701 (statement ofEnrique de Vedia);
REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 33, June 24, 1994; 2:00 P.M., at 1840 (statement ofEmilia Juafiuk
& Julio Humada).
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space. Thus, the human rights community remained, for the most part,
aloof and disinterested during most of the Constitutional Assembly.
The Constitutional Assembly charged the Treaty Commission with
jurisdiction over human rights concerns. 73  The focus of this
Commission was not human rights, but rather, the juridical status of
international treaties' 74 and Mercosur.17 Human rights treaties gained
special constitutional standing, not necessarily because of their
substance, but because they were a symbolic break from the past and
thus enhanced Argentina's reputation and standing vis- -vis Mercosur
and other economic integration efforts.176 Thus, human rights issues
arose incidental to these other concerns, woven into the Constitution
173. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. The Constitutional Assembly discussed the
treaty issue at length in the following parts of the Constitutional Assembly's record: REC.
CONST. ASSEMBLY, Nos. 3,7, 10, 15, 16, 17, 19-22,24-26,28,31,33,35 (1994).
174. As noted above, Argentina's pre-1994 Constitution was somewhat ambiguous with
regard to the status of international treaties, particularly concerning the potential conflict
between Article 27 and Article 31. See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text. Many
delegates viewed Article 75(22) as a mere opportunity to clarify this hyper-legal ambiguity. See
REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 19, June 17, 1994, 11:00 A.M., at 786 (statement of Guillermo E.
Est6vez B oero, Alfredo P. Bravo & Norberto L. La Porta); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 22, June
22, 1994, 1:00 P.M., at 88 (statement of Augusto J.M. Alasino); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No.
24, June 22, 1994, 5:00 P.M., at 1013 (statement of Alberto A. Natale, Pablo A. Cardinale &
Carlos A. Caballero Martfn); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 26, June 23, 1994, 1:30 P.M., at 1255
(statement of Juan C. Hitters); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 35, June 24, 1994; 5:30 P.M., at
1975 (statement of Alberto E. Balestrini).
Other delegates argued that constitutionalization was necessary to comport with
obligations assumed under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See REC. CONST.
ASSEMBLY No. 19, June 17, 1994, 11:00 A.M., at 786 (statement of Guillermo E. Estevez
Boero, Alfredo P. Bravo & Norberto L. La Porta); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 21, June 21,
1994,6:00 P.M., at 848 (statement of Rodolfo 0. Ponce de Le6n); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No.
21, June 21, 1994, 6:00 P.M., at 861 (statement of Hector J. Carattoli); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY
No. 31, June 24, 1994, 12:00 P.M., at 1701 (statement of Enrique de Vedia). See also Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 27, U.N. GAOR,
Ist Sess., U.N. Doc. AICONF.39/27 (1969) ("A party may not invoke the provisions of its
internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.").
Others believed that constitutionalization was necessary to comport with Article 2 of the
American Convention, which requires that states conform domestic law to international
obligations. See REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 21, June 21, 1994, 6:00P.M., at 849 (statement
of Rodolfo 0. Ponce de Le6n). See also American Convention, supra note 44, art. 2.
175. Mercosur is a common market among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, based
on coordinated reductions in customs tariffs, elimination of non-tariff barriers, a common
external tariff, and macroeconomic policy coordination. See Treaty Establishing a Common
Market (Treaty of Asuncion), Arg.-Braz.-Para.-Uru., Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041 (1991);
Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Asuncion on the Institutional Structure of Mercosur
("Protocol of Ouro Preto"), Dec. 17, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 1244 (1995) (creation of Mercosur's
institutional structure, including Common Market Council, Common Market Group, Mercosur
Trade Commission, Joint Parliamentary Commission, Economic and Social Consultative Forum,
and Mercosur Administrative Secretariat); Protocol of Brasilia for the Settlement of Disputes,
Dec. 17, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 691 (1997) (creation of a Dispute Settlement System). See generally
Thomas Andrew O'Keefe, An Analysis of the Mercosur Economic Integration Project from a
Legal Perspective, 28 INT'LLAW. 439 (1994).
176. For a thorough discussion of Mercosur's prominent role in the debates regarding
Article 75(22), see infra notes 245-51 and accompanying text.
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concomitant to more general consideration of international treaties. In
a body charged with finding the proper status for international treaties,
in particular integration treaties, human rights were an appendage. The
human rights community, therefore, did not have a clear, uncluttered
forum in which to debate substantive human rights issues. Whereas the
human rights community could have been-should have been-Article
75(22)'s most vociferous ally, their spirit remained largely untapped
because human rights themselves remained on the periphery of
constitutional debate.
The mode of internalization-wholesale constitutionalization of
entire human rights treaties-was perhaps the noxious by-product of the
relegation of human rights concerns to a relatively disinterested
committee. Recall that Argentina, as opposed to many South American
countries, 177 did not borrow clauses from human rights treaties to
develop and modernize the individual rights portion of its
Constitution.178 Instead, Argentina transplanted in toto entire human
rights treaties, creating a type of mega-constitutional appendage. With
the limited exception of delegates who championed women's rights, 179
delegates were not engaged in debate regarding particular individual
rights, but rather, debated whether to annex entire treaties to the
Constitution. The presumption throughout the Argentine Constitutional
Assembly was "all or nothing"-either incorporation of all or none of
the principles contained in any one, or several, human rights treaties. 8
177. See supra notes 50-86 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 137-55 and accompanying text.
179. A few of the delegates focused on treaties dealing with women's/children's rights. See
REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 3, June 3, 1994, 6:30 P.M., at 163 (concerned with equality,
discrimination, and enhancing enforcement of rights found in the Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 15,
June 14, 1994, 10:00 P.M., at 575 (statement of Pedro Perette, Susana Melo, Humberto E.
Salum & Luis M. Aguilar Torres); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 17, June 15, 1994,9:30 P.M.,
at 670 (statement of Cecilia Lipsyzc, Juan Schroeder, Maria Sanchez, Rina Leiva, Daniel
Garcia, Adriana Puiggr6s & Ana M. Pizzurno) (proposed constitutionalization only of women's
rights treaties); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 19, June 17, 1994, 11:00 A.M., at 784 (statement
of Teresita B. Serrat) (anti-abortion rhetoric veiled in discussion of importance of right to life
and women's rights); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 22, June 22, 1994; 1:00 P.M., at 910
(statement of Maria T. Mdndez, Dora Rocha de Feldman, Maria L Casari de Alarcia & Elso G.
Gonzilez) (detailed discussion about the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women and the desire to constitutionalize this treaty).
Women's rights groups had a multi-issue agenda at the Constitutional Assembly, with
their priorities being Article 37, which granted women the right to significant representation in
political parties, and Article 75(23), which potentially could have banned abortions but instead
set forth a comprehensive social security regime. Thus, women's groups' advocacy on behalf
of Article 75(22) may have been incidental to these other concerns.
180. Of sixteen proposals to constitutionalize human rights treaties, fourteen even failed to
differentiate among human rights treaties and recommended constitutionalization of all of them.
See REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 16, June 15, 1994,3:00 P.M., at 34; REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY
No. 17, June 15, 1994, 9:30 P.M., at 679-81 (statement of Eduardo S. Barcesat); REC. CONST.
ASSEMBLY No. 19, June 17, 1994, 11:00 A.M., at 779 (statement of Maria N. Meana Garcfa,
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While this type of wholesale incorporation may have been the most
efficient mode, it was not the most effective. Those few human rights
discussions that did occur took place in undifferentiated terms. There
was no discussion regarding the death penalty-discussion that could
have prompted the support of criminal defendant rights groups; there
was no discussion of the freedom of speech-discussion that could have
motivated ACLU-like, individual liberties groups; and there was no
discussion regarding the rights of indigenous populations-discussion
that could have tapped into national and international non-governmental
organizations. Different public interest groups may have been engaged
if they had perceived an opening in the debate for prioritization,
hierarchy, and differentiation among various rights. These groups could
have become transformative transnational actors, entrenched in the
ultimate success of Article 75(22). Instead, the human rights
community, for the most part, remained aloof.
Nevertheless, Article 75(22) ultimately did differentiate among
human rights treaties, granting some constitutional status while granting
others mere supra-statutory status."' This differentiation, however, was
not the result of meaningful prioritization of some human rights and
thus did not transform potentially interested parties into engaged
Pablo Verani, Horacio Massaccesi & Santiago A. Hemandez); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 20,
June 21, 1994, 11:00 A.M., at 832 (statement of Marfa Bercoff); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No.
20, June 21, 1994, 11:00 A.M., at 835 (statement of Ana M. Dressino); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY
No. 21, June 21, 1994,6:00 P.M., at 848 (statement of Nilda Romero); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY
No. 21, June 21, 1994, 6:00 P.M., at 876 (statement of Angel Prado); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY
No. 22, June 22, 1994, 1:00 P.M., at 888 (statement of Augusto J.M. Alasino); REC. CONST.
ASSEMBLY NO. 22, June 22, 1994, 1:00 P.M., at 898 (statement of Juan F. Armagnague); REC.
CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 22, June 22, 1994, 1:00 P.M., at 910 (statement of Marfa T. M6ndez,
Dora Rocha de Feldman, Maria L Casari de Alarcia & Elso G. Gonzdlez); REC. CONST.
ASSEMBLY No. 24, June 22, 1994,5:00 P.M., at 1071 (statement of Juan M. Pedersoli, Olga C.
Abraham & Pascual A. Rampi); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 25, June 22, 1994, 8:30 P.M., at
1120; REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 25, June 22, 1994, 8:30 P.M., at 1138 (statement of Alicia
Oliveira & Eugenio R. Zaffaroni); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 33, June 24, 1994, 2:00 P.M.,
at 1822 (statement of Enrique G. Cardosa); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLYNO. 33, June 24, 1994; 2:00
P.M., at 1840 (statement of Emilia Juafiuk & Julio Humada).
The following proposals recommended constitutionalization of particulartypes of human
rights treaties: see REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 17, June 15, 1994, 9:30 P.M., at 670 (statement
of Cecilia Lipsyzc, Juan Schroeder, Maria Sanchez, Rina Leiva, Daniel Garcfa, Adriana
Puiggr6s & Ana M. Pizzurno) (only women's rights treaties); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 19,
June 17, 1994, 11:00 A.M., at 784 (statement of Teresita B. Serrat) (constitutionalization of any
treaty including right to life provision and addressing discrimination).
181. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text. While nine human rights treaties are
on par with the Constitution, other human rights treaties merely stand superior to domestic
statutes but inferior to the Constitution. The constitutional provision granting all human rights
treaties, at a minimum, supra-statutory status codifies the Supreme Court's decision in
"Ekmekdijin," CSJN (1992). Those human rights treaties which do not enjoy constitutional
standing nonetheless further enforcement of human rights because, in standing superior to
domestic law, they are not susceptible to abrogation by a subsequent statute. See supra note
89 and accompanying text for an explanation of the last-in-time rule. However, constitutional
provisions could circumscribe and potentially nullify provisions in human rights treaties that
do not enjoy constitutional standing.
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transnational actors. After the Commission on Integration and
International Treaties received recommendations and comments, it
drafted a proposal which, reflecting the sentiments discussed above,'82
constitutionalized all the human rights treaties which Argentina had
ratified. 8 3 Yet, Article 75(22) ultimately constitutionalized only nine
182. See supra note 180 and accompanying text for discussion of proposals regarding
breadth of constitutionalization.
183. See CONVENCI6N NACIONAL CONSTITUYENTE, DICTAMEN DE COMISI6N DE
INTEGRACI6N Y TRATADOS INTERNACIONALES A LA CoMIsI6N DE REDACCI6N No. 7 (July 13,
1994) [hereinafter DICTAMEN No. 7] ("International treaties regarding human rights, that are
ratified, enjoy constitutional standing, and the rights, liberties and guarantees that they sanctify
are considered self-executing") (translations by the Author).
The Commission also listed all human rights treaties that Argentina had ratified, noting
that the list was not exclusive and could be amended as Argentina ratified additional treaties.
See CONVENCI6N NACIONAL CONSTtTUYENTE, DICrAMEN DE CoMIsI6N DE INTEGRACI6N Y
TRATADOS INTERNACIONALES A LA COMISI6N DE REDACCI6N No. 11 (July 13, 1994). The list,
in chronological order of Argentine ratification, includes the following: Universal Declaration,
supra note 44; American Convention on the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 44;
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 44;
Geneva Convention on International Humanitarian Law, adopted Aug. 12,1949,6 U.S.T. 3114,
3217, 3316, 3516,75 U.N.T.S. 31,85, 135,287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Convention
for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of
Others, opened for signature Mar. 21, 1950, 96 U.N.T.S. 271; Convention on the Status of
Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954); Convention on the Political
Rights of Women, 193 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force July 7, 1954); Supplemental
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar
to Slavery, 226 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Apr. 30, 1957); Convention Against
Discrimination in Education, 429 U.N.T.S. 93 (entered into force Dec. 14, 1960); International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note 44;
International Covenant (including Protocol), supra note 44; International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 44; American Convention, supra note 44;
Abolition of Forced Labor Convention, ILO No. 105,320 U.N.T.S. 291 (entered into force Jan.
17, 1959); Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, G.A. Res 1040(XI), 11 th Sess.
(entered into force Jan. 29, 1957); Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for
Marriage, and Registration of Marriages, 521 U.N.T.S. 231 (entered into force Dec. 9, 1964);
Declaration of the Rights of Disabled Persons, G.A. Res. 3447(XXX), U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess.,
Supp. No. 34, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, 6 U.S.T.
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva Convention on the Treatment
of Prisoners of War, 6 U.S.T. 3316,75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War, 6 U.S.T. 3516,
T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annex I, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (entered into
force Dec. 7, 1978); Convention between the American Republics regarding the Status of Aliens
in their Respective Territories, signed Feb. 20, 1928,46 Stat. 2753, T.S. No. 815, 132 L.N.T.S.
301; Convention on the Nationality of Women, signed Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 2957 (entered
into force Aug. 29, 1934); Inter-American Convention on the Granting of Civil Rights to
Women, Pan. Am. Union L. & Treaty Series No. 27; Inter-American Convention on the
Granting of Political Rights to Women, opened for signature May 2, 1948, 27 U.S.T. 3301,
T.I.A.S. No. 8365 (entered into force Mar. 17, 1949); International Convention on the
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, opened for signature Nov. 30, 1972,
G.A. Res. 3068, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc A/9030 (1974) (entered into
force July 19, 1976); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, supra note 44; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhumane, Degrading Treatment or Punishments, supra note 44; Interamerican Convention for
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human rights treaties."8 4 What transpired to transform the Treaty
Commission's inclusive proposal into the relatively restrictive text that
became Article 75(22)? Finally, was there debate and discussion
regarding prioritization of rights? We will never know and can only
speculate. The Constitutional Assembly's Comisi6n de Redacci6n
(Drafting Committee), comprised primarily of delegates from the
"pactista" parties,"1 5 made final drafting decisions behind closed doors,
imperviously sequestered from the influence or participation of any
NGOs, including human rights organizations. In fact, the Drafting
Committee itself grew from political compromise, designed to be the
"true space for political and ideological control on the part of the
'pactista' parties." 186  While some commentators speculate on the
rationale behind the Drafting Committee's substantial paring down of
the proposal, 187 there is no record of its members' discussions and no
hard evidence of their reasoning. At the moment when the
Constitutional Assembly could have directed the debate on human rights
from the generic to the specific, from a monolithic conception to a
somewhat differentiated discussion of the merit of some treaties vis-h.-
vis the merit of others, from a sterile, nonengaging discourse to an
animating, participation-invoking discussion, the debate became the
exclusive realm of the Drafting Committee.
The Drafting Committee's closed door decisions also hindered
Article 75(22)'s ability to tap transnational actors interested more
generally in international law issues. The question of whether treaties
are self-executing or non-self-executing is integrally related to the
juridical status of such treaties.' Most countries resolve this issue in
the domestic courts, as parties attempt to invoke rights or obligations
the Prevention and Punishment of Torture, supra note 44; and Convention on the Rights of the
Child, supra note 44.
The minority proposal coming from the Treaty Commission was the following: "Once
ratified and published, international treaties will prevail over the domestic laws of the Nation."
DICTAMEN No. 7, supra note 183.
See also Graham & Cafiero, supra note 107, at 28 (discussing proposal emanating from
Treaty Commission).
184. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
185. "Pactista" references the parties to the Pacto de Olivos. See supra notes 37-39 and
165-67 and accompanying text.
186. See Vega, supra note 38, at 11.
187. See Graham & Cafiero, supra note 107, at 28 (suggesting that the Drafting Committee
chose to constitutionalize those treaties that were universal, that bore particular significance to
Argentina's recent history, and that came to the aid of those members of society that had been
historically underrepresented).
188. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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contained in various treaties. 189 Is Argentina required to enact enabling
legislation, other than the ratification instrument, before international
treaties, including those which enjoy constitutional status, are deemed
operable law? Many delegates proposed explicit clarification of this
issue in the Constitution itself."9 Others viewed constitutionalization as
tantamount to creating a group of self-executing treaties and thus
proposed constitutionalization as a remedy to extant ambiguity.' 91 The
Treaty Commission's ultimate proposal explicitly granted self-executing
status to the rights contained in the anointed human rights treaties.192
The Drafting Committee, however, removed all references to the self-
executing issue from the Constitution's text, thus leaving the new
Constitution as ambiguous as the former. 193 While most commentators
believe that the rights contained in constitutionalized treaties-indeed,
189. In the United States, "[w]hether an agreement is to be given effect without further
legislation is an issue that a court must decide when a party seeks to invoke the agreement as
law." RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 111 cmt. h. InAsakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924),
a Japanese alien challenged a city ordinance allowing only United States citizens to obtain
pawnbroking licenses by invoking a provision of a treaty between the United States and Japan.
The Court invalidated the ordinance on the grounds that the treaty was self-executing, noting
that the treaty "operates of itself without the aid of any legislation.., and it will be applied and
given authoritative effect by the courts." Id. at 341. For an example of the Court's finding a
treaty to be non-self-executing, see Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. City of Knoxville, 227 U.S. 39
(1913).
190. Many delegates submitted proposals which explicitly stated that human rights treaties
bearing constitutional status would be self-executing. See REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY NO. 17, June
15, 1994, 9:30 P.M., at 654 (statement of Elisa M.A. Carrio); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 20,
June 21, 1994, 11:00 A.M., at 832 (statement of Maria Bercoff); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No.
22, June 22, 1994, 1:00 P.M., at 898 (statement of Juan F. Armagnague); REC. CONST.
ASSEMBLY No. 25, June 22, 1994, 8:30 P.M., at 1120 (statement of Maria Z.. Lucero); REC.
CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 33, June 24, 1994, 2:00 P.M., at 1822 (statement of Enrique G.
Cardosa).
Other delegates proposed that all international treaties are self-executing. See REC.
CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 19, June 17, 1994, 11:00 A.M., at 786 (statement of Guillermo E.
Estevez Boero, Alfredo P. Bravo & Norberto L. La Porta).
191. See REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 21, June 21, 1994, 6:00 P.M., at 848 (statement of
Rodolfo 0. Ponce de Le6n) (after reviewing Argentine, provincial, and international
jurisprudence regarding self-executing/non-self-executing issue, concluding that there is a
strong presumption that international treaties are self-executing, believes that
constitutionalization bolsters this presumption, and further drafts a constitutional amendment
that would embody this presumption); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 31, June 24, 1994, 12:00
P.M., at 1701 (statement of Enrique de Vedia) (raising international treaties above domestic law
will transform them into self-executing documents); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 33, June 24,
1994, 2:00 P.M., at 1840 (statement of Emilia Juafiuk & Julio Humada) (constitutionalization
will make treaties self-executing).
192. See DICTAMEN No. 7, supra note 183 ("International treaties regarding human rights,
that are ratified, enjoy constitutional standing, and the rights, liberties and guarantees that they
sanctify are considered self-executing".).
193. The current constitutional text does not make any reference to the self-executing/non-
self-executing issue. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text. See also Graham &
Cafiero, supra note 107, at 42-46 (noting that the Drafting Committee rejected the Treaty
Commission's proposal).
[37:281
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
in all human rights treaties-are self-executing, 94 the ambiguity remains
left to the courts to resolve. 95
What are the implications in terms of our transnational actor
analysis? Numerous transnational actors care deeply about the self-
executing/non-self-executing dichotomy. Virtually any person or entity
with international contacts will have a position-a stake-in the
resolution of the self-executing dilemma; any business person who has
an interest in international commercial treaties, any exporter who has a
stake in immediate enforcement of international trade agreements, and
any prosecutor who would like immediate enforcement of Argentina's
extradition agreements. The Treaty Commission hoped to entrench a
partial solution in Article 75(22). This would have linked many of these
generalized international interests to the ultimate fate of Article 75(22).
Instead, the Drafting Committee sanitized the ultimate provision and
thus left these potential transnational actors to fight their battles
elsewhere, maybe in the courts or in the legislature, but definitely outside
the epistemic space granted to Article 75(22).
The Constitutional Assembly-through its delegation of human
rights issues to a committee dedicated generically to international treaties
and integration, the concomitant presumption that human rights would
be internalized in a wholesale manner, and the relegation of final
decisions to a closed-door, non-participatory Drafting Committee-
missed a ripe opportunity to create a loyal cadre of transnational actors
from the human rights community, as well as from those with more
generalized international law-related interests. Nevertheless, intern-
alization of international law is a dynamic process. The disenfran-
chisement of the human rights community during the codification of
Argentina's internalization strategy does not preclude them from
entering Article 75(22)'s epistemic space at some point in the future. In
fact, as will be discussed herein, human rights NGOs are currently
working to anchor Article 75(22) in Argentina's legal discourse and
practice. Nonetheless, Argentina's internalization strategy would have
had powerful propagating momentum had the human rights community
left the Constitutional Assembly as energized transnational actors.
194. See Graham & Cafiero, supra note 107, at 42-46 (arguing that the Drafting Committee
did not materially alter the proposals of the Treaty Commission and that human rights treaties
are self-executing).
195. See, e.g., "Ekmekdjidn," CSJN (1992) (stating that an international norm is self-
executing when it does not require Congress to establish additional institutions to support the
norm). See also Advisory Opinion OC-7/86, Inter-Am. C.H.R., ser. A, no. 7 (Aug. 29, 1986)
(noting that Articles 1 and 2 of the American Convention, requiring states to recognize and
guarantee all rights included therein, create a strong presumption that these rights are self-
executing).
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2. The Domestic Courts in the Wake of the Constitutional Assembly:
Passive Transnational Actors
The Argentine domestic court system is perhaps the essential link
between the constitutional text and actual protection of human rights-
between the domestic and international legal communities. To date,
however, the Argentine courts have been relatively passive transnational
actors, failing to harness the potency and breadth of international human
rights law. The following section will trace the Supreme Court's, as well
as some lower courts', use of their new constitutional tools (i.e., human
rights treaties) in deciding cases. The survey concludes that courts have
not yet mobilized to become potent transnational actors in Article
75(22)'s epistemic community. Without energy, enthusiasm, activism,
and creativity, the courts will not effectively absorb international law
into Argentina's domestic legal community.
a. The Supreme Court
In its initial confrontation with Article 75(22), the Court appears as
an energetic soldier. In Giroldi, the Court contemplated the
constitutionality of appellate procedures in criminal courts.'96 The Court
ultimately concluded that the procedures were unconstitutional pursuant
to a provision of the American Convention which mandates that
convicted criminal defendants have the right to an appeal.' By framing
the case as one of constitutional import, yet relying on the American
Convention for ultimate legal support, the Court consecrated the
constitutional status of international human rights treaties. More
important, in relying on the American Convention as its legal crutch, the
Court ruminated on the meaning of Article 75(22) and concluded that
international jurisprudence, specifically the opinions of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, "should serve as a guide for the
interpretation" of the Convention's provisions.'98 Thus, the Court
concluded that the 1994 constitutional reform imported not only the text
of several human rights treaties but also attendant interpretive
jurisprudence.
While Giroldi suggests an active role for the Court, in its
subsequent cases, the Supreme Court recoiled, becoming a rather
196. See "Giroldi, Horacio David," CSJN (1995) (copy on file with Author) (translations
of the case are by the Author).
197. See American Convention, supra note 44, art. 8(h) ("During the [criminal]
proceedings, every person is entitled, with full equality, to the following minimum guarantees:
the right to appeal the judgment to a higher court.").
198. "Giroldi," CSJN (1995), 11. In reality, the Court had been using international
jurisprudence as an interpretive guide long before the Giroldi decision. See, e.g.,
"Ekmekdji~n," CSJN (1992), at 17. Thus, Giroldi is a reaffirmation of past practice in a post-
constitutional reform climate.
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passive, detached actor.' 99 In these cases, the Court generally recognized
the newly anointed position of human rights treaties.2" While the Court
cited international conventions, its decisions neither interpreted their
meaning, pursuant to Giroldi, nor decisively relied on international law
in reaching its conclusions2°l-instead, international law provided a mere
cushion for the decision. In each instance, the Court could have
animated international human rights treaties, interpreting relevant
conventional law and catapulting that law into the forefront of
constitutional jurisprudence. The Court, however, conservatively
avoided this challenge. As a result, international human rights law lies
more or less latent.2 °2
199. See "H.C.S.," CSJN (1995) (copy on file with Author) (upholding the legality of
forced blood samples to prove paternity); "Viafia, Roberto," CSJN (1995) (copy on file with
Author) (granting habeas corpus petition after holding imprisonment of local legislator for
defamatory statements to be illegal); "Gabrielli, Mario Carlos," CSJN (1996) (copy on file with
Author) (translations of the case are by the Author) (upholding legality of discharge of soldier
for failure to inform superiors of marriage pursuant to military law).
200. See "Gabrielli," CSJN (1996), 1 5 ("Besides, the 1994 Constitutional Reform has
incorporated as part of the constitutional hierarchy... the rights consecrated in certain human
rights treaties"); "H.C.S.," CSJN (1995), [ 13 (noting that Article 75(22) grants the Convention
on the Rights of the Child constitutional hierarchy).
201. In H.C.S., a case involving forced blood samples to prove paternity, the Court relied
on three sources of law related to the right to privacy and the right against self-incrimination:
1) domestic statutes (the Court cites various provisions of the Penal and Civil Codes, especially
those that concern intrusions on individual liberty and privacy, as well as those dealing with
documenting birth and national identity); 2) relevant constitutional provisions (including Article
18, which protects individuals from forced self-incrimination, and Article 19, which states'"The
private actions of men that in no way offend public order or morality, nor injure a third party,
are reserved only to God and are exempt from the authority of the magistrates"); and 3) Article
7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (stating that children have the right to know their
parents and to be cared for by them). The Court expends little energy developing the
Convention-based law, and the Convention is not a decisive arbiter of the Court's decision. See
"H.C.S.," CSJN (1995).
In Vialia, a case dealing with the imprisonment of a local legislator for defamatory
statements, the Court examines the law pertaining to freedom of expression. While the Court
cites the American Convention (see American Convention supra note 44, art. 13), it relies on
domestic statutes and the Constitution in reaching its decision to grant the habeas petition. See
"Viafia," CSJN (1995).
In Gabrielli, a soldier was discharged under military law for failure to inform superiors
of his marriage. The Court upheld the military code provision. While it lists the international
treaties that grant individuals the right to marry (see Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
supra note 44, art. 16(1); International Covenant, supra note 44, art. 23; American Convention,
supra note 44, art. 17), the Court relies on limiting domestic case law and statutes that hold that
the military law requiring soldiers to inform superiors of marriage is reasonable. See
"Gabrielli," CSJN (1996).
202. One may counter that the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly avoids constitutional
decisions and that the Argentine Supreme Court, in avoiding decisions based on international
treaties (the Constitution), was merely following such practice. Yet, the United States is not
haunted by a recent history of deprivation of fundamental rights, as Argentina is. The Argentine
Supreme Court, if it had embraced the Constitution and human rights treaties, could have played
an important role, not only in Article 75(22)'s epistemic community, but also in the
consecration of fundamental rights that is crucial to Argentina's distancing itself from its past.
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Worse, some recent opinions suggest that the Court may become a
rogue member of Article 75(22)'s epistemic community. The Court has
recently become more aggressive in its use of human rights treaties. In
doing so, however, it has twisted international law against individual
petitioners, hindering rather than helping compliance efforts. In
Bramajo, the Court entertained the legality of a lengthy, pretrial
preventative detention.2 3 The American Convention grants individuals
the right to "be brought promptly before a judge or other officer
authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to a
trial within a reasonable time .... ,,2' Recognizing that the American
Convention enjoys constitutional status and that Giroldi authorizes the
Court to use international jurisprudence as an interpretational aid,2 °5 the
Court relied on a 1989 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
opinion pertaining to the length of pretrial detention in Argentina. 0 6
According to the Commission, local judges should be the arbiters of the
"reasonableness" of a pretrial detention.0 7 Interpreting the Com-
mission's decision as allowing "reasonableness" to be determined solely
according to domestic standards, the Court relied on its own case law in
upholding the lower court's decision to sanction the constitutionality of
a three-year pretrial detention. Consequently, decisions of local judges
remain impervious to international law.
In a subsequent case, Chocobar,2 °8 the Court contemplated the
constitutionality of post hoc changes in Argentina's social security
program. While the Court admitted that certain international human
rights provisions, now enjoying constitutional status, could potentially
undermine the legality of the state's actions,20 9 it eschewed international
law and instead rooted its decision in archaic Supreme Court decisions
which interpreted the 1853 Constitution as granting the government
carte blanche authority over the social security regime.2'0 The Court
justified its reasoning-its disregard of international law in the name of
domestic law-with Article 75(22) itself: none of the international
human rights treaty provisions should "curtail the rights or guarantees
203. See "Bramajo, Hemna Javier," CSJN (1996) (copy on file with Author) (translations
of the case are by the Author).
204. American Convention, supra note 44, art. 7(5).
205. See "Bramajo," CSJN (1996), at 2. See also supra notes 193-95 and accompanying
text.
206. See "Bramajo," CSJN (1996), at 2.
207. Id.
208. "Chocobar, Sixto C.," CSJN [1997-B] L.L. 240.
209. See id. at 243 (quoting Article 22 of the Universal Declaration, which guarantees all
persons the "right to social security," and Article 26 of the American Convention, through
which States parties promise to adopt internal measures that will further its economic
obligations).
210. See "Chocobar," CSJN (1997), at 243-44.
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provided for in the Constitution .. .and should be understood as
complementing the rights and guarantees provided for therein." '' The
Court viewed its antedated decisions based on constitutional law as
"rights or guarantees provided for in the Constitution," thus
manipulating Article 75(22) to require international law to bow to these
opinions. This formula-international human rights must harmonize
with other constitutional rights, and the interpretation of those
constitutional rights is governed by prior court decisions-creates a
formidable and potent obstacle to the Court's exploration, activation, and
unleashing of international human rights law. Chocobar's analysis
allows the Court to remain a passive, if not an aberrant, transnational
actor.
b. Lower Court Decisions
While a comprehensive review of post-1994 lower court decisions
is beyond the scope of this Article, a representative survey from the
lower federal courts based in Buenos Aires suggests that these courts are
emulating the Supreme Court's passive approach.2"2 In general, judges
recognized that the 1994 Constitution incorporates select human rights
treaties."' Most judges, however, merely listed international treatyprovisions in conjunction with domestic statutes and decisions.2"4 Thus,
211. CONST. ARG. (1994) art. 75(22).
212. See, e.g., "Gonzalez, Juan Jose s/if. ley 23.737," Buenos Aires, at 358 (Mar. 10, 1995)
(myriad of criminal procedure violations, including forced confession outside presence of
lawyer, illegal detention, and police brutality); "Astudillo Sanchez, Ramiro," Buenos Aires, at
442 (Mar. 22, 1995) (reasonable duration of imprisonment); "Pilade Fava L.M. s/
sobreseimiento," Buenos Aires (May 30, 1995) (imprisonment for repayment of debts);
"Perasco, Luis C. s/art. 1, ley 24.390," Buenos Aires (Feb. 13, 1996) (reasonable duration of
imprisonment); "Blanco, R.A. s/ recusaci6n," Buenos Aires, at 123 (Feb. 22, 1996) (right to
impartial tribunal); "Bisbal de Haase, M. s/ cosa juzgada," Buenos Aires (Mar. 4, 1996)
(protection from being placed in double jeopardy); "Furguielle, Silvio s/ sobreseimiento,"
Buenos Aires (Mar. 27, 1996) (reasonable length of pretrial detention); "Lescano, S.B. s/
nulidad," Buenos Aires (Aug. 22, 1996) (right to privacy, dignity of person, illegal search and
seizure (vaginal drug searches)); "Paris, Alfredo Oscar s/ excarcelaci6n," Olivos, at Part V
(Nov. 1996) (preventative detention for sick detainee; right to health and right to be brought
before a judge in reasonable time); "Comador, Hernan Nicolas sI intemaci6n," Olivos (Nov.
1996) (exploring constitutional rights of HIV-positive prisoners to special medical care);
"Moreno Ocampo, L. s/ recusaci6n," Buenos Aires, at 1498 (Nov. 22, 1996) (right to be
adjudged before an impartial tribunal); "Cavallo, D.F. s/ excepci6n falta de acci6n y
jurisdicci6n," Buenos Aires (Feb. 24, 1997) (right to equal protection before the law).
213. See, e.g., "Pilade Fava," Buenos Aires (May 30, 1995) (stating that the American
Convention now has constitutional standing as a result of Article 75(22)); "Perasco," Buenos
Aires (Feb. 13,1996) (noting that the International Covenant is incorporated into the
Constitution via Article 75(22)); "Furguielle," Buenos Aires (Mar. 27, 1996) (the court must
interpret the reasonableness of pretrial detentions pursuant to the Constitution, which now
includes international treaties); "Lescano," Buenos Aires (Aug. 22, 1996) (noting that
international treaties now have constitutional standing).
214. See, e.g., "Lescano," Buenos Aires (Aug. 22, 1996) (in case contesting the legality of
vaginal searches for drugs, the court notes as relevant the right to be free from cruel, unusual
and inhuman punishment and the right to personal dignity, listing, but not discussing the
1999]
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
as with much Supreme Court jurisprudence, international law provides
additional, although non-critical, legal support for the judge's
conclusions. With rather terse, fleeting treatment of international law,
it is no surprise that few judges embrace Giroldi and engage in any
interpretative analysis of international human rights law or peruse
international jurisprudence. 215 This type of interpretation and analysis
would undoubtedly and beneficially force judges to wrestle with
international human rights law and mobilize the courts as fruitful
transnational actors.
In merely listing international law along with domestic
(constitutional and statutory) law, courts have not yet grappled with what
it means for human rights treaties to have constitutional standing. Few
judges differentiate human rights treaties' pre-1994 legal status from
their post- 1994 constitutional status,216 and they generally do not harness
the elevated constitutional status of human rights treaties. Beyond rotely
stating that some human rights treaties have constitutional standing
pursuant to Article 75(22),217 judges have not invoked their special
constitutional status in reaching decisions. Thus, the analytical rhythm
changes little in post-1994 decisions. The year 1994 did not represent
some magically-disjunctive moment in terms of the courts' analytic style,
approach, or potency. From a functional-legal perspective, constitu-
tionalization has proved rather redundant in that courts are not using
international treaties differently than they did under Ekmekdidn. z1 8 The
substance of, select provisions of the American Convention and the International
Covenant-ultimately resting its decision on domestic law); "Gonzalez," Buenos Aires (Mar.
10, 1995) (in case implicating right to counsel of choice, the court cites relevant provisions of
the American Convention and the International Covenant; however, the court merely lists
international sources of law and uses them to cushion its conclusion, which rests on criminal
procedure codes in domestic law).
215. Some cases actually defy Giroldi. For example, in a case concerning the
reasonableness of a three-year delay in presenting a case to ajudge, the court cites Article 7(5)
of the American Convention (which reads "Any person detained shall be ... entitled to trial
within a reasonable time or to be released without prejudice to the continuation of the
proceedings"), yet the court looks toward domestic decisions for interpretive guidance in the
face of compelling internationaljurisprudence. See "Furguielle," Buenos Aires (Mar. 27, 1996)
(citing eight domestic decisions to interpret the meaning of "brought to trial within reasonable
time"). Thus, the court flouts Giroldi's instructions to use international jurisprudence in
deciphering international law.
216. See supra note 102-22 and accompanying text.
217. See "Bramajo," CSJN (1996), at 2. See also supra note 213 and accompanying text.
218. For example, in a pre-constitutional reform case dealing with the right to a translator,
the court relied in part on Article 8(2) of the American Convention in ordering one. See "Khalil
H. Dib s/ desig. int~rprete," Buenos Aires (July 25, 1994); American Convention, supra note
44, art. 8(2)(a) ("the right of the accused to be assisted without charge by a translator or
interpreter, if he does not understand or does not speak the language of the tribunal or the
court"). While the American Convention did not yet enjoy constitutional standing, Argentina's
legislature had incorporated the American Convention into its statutory scheme, and the
Supreme Court had endowed it with the ability to preempt conflicting statutes. See Law No.
23,054, Mar. 19, 1984 (copy on file with Author); "Ekmekdjidn," CSJN (1992); supra notes
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lower courts, like the Supreme Court, are latent, if not impotent,
transnational actors.
3. Transnational Actors in Potential Conflict: Argentina's Legal
System vs. Inter-American Human Rights System
As transnational actors form "epistemic communities," their ability
to reconstitute domestic interests to embrace an international norm
increases exponentially. Argentina's internalization strategy failed to
create an effective "epistemic community," not only because it failed to
mobilize potential transnational actors, but also because it created
competing rather than mutually-reinforcing relationships between two
key transnational actors: Argentina's court system and the Inter-
American human rights system.
While the Argentine courts are not currently meeting their
potential,219 they are the key domestic transnational actors and should
serve as the crucial link between written, constitutional guarantees and
the vindication of individual rights. They may invigorate human rights
treaties and interpret international norms. They are, for all intents and
purposes, the domestic "transmission belt,"22 carrying international
human rights norms to an individual level and thus transporting
international law to the most fundamental unit in domestic society.
The Inter-American human rights system is also an important
transnational actor. When Argentina incorporated the American
Convention into its Constitution, it imported not only the rights
contained therein but also the system which the Convention
consecrates.22" ' Argentina thus internalized and constitutionalized the
entire regional system, comprised of an investigative/executive prong,
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and ajudicial prong,
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.2 2 One of these now-
108-16 and accompanying text. Thus, prior to constitutional reform, the Convention also served
as a viable source of law that could invalidate official action.
219. See supra notes 199 and accompanying text.
220. Koh, supra note 7, at 2651.
221. The American Convention may essentially be divided into two parts. Part I delineates
rights, including civil and political rights (Chapter II, Articles 3-25) and economic, social and
cultural rights (Chapter III, Articles 26-31). Part II constitutes the Inter-American institutions,
including the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Chapter VII, Articles 34-5 1) and
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Chapter VIII, Articles 52-73). See American
Convention, supra note 44.
222. Once a "person or group ofpersons, or any non-governmental entity legally recognized
in one or more member states," exhausts domestic remedies, meets the six month statute of
limitations, and proves that the subject of the petition is not pending in another international
proceeding, the Commission shall consider complaints of violations of the Convention by States
Parties. American Convention, supra note 44, arts. 44, 46(1). Assuming that the petition is
admissible, the Commission then investigates the allegations and issues a confidential report
to the States Parties. See id. arts. 48, 50(1). Within three months following the issuance of the
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constitutionalized provisions requires that individuals seeking to
vindicate rights before the Commission, and later the Court, exhaust
domestic legal remedies, including the domestic court system. 22 3 Thus,
Argentina's Constitution, albeit through the appendage of the American
Convention, contains a provision which requires petitioners to utilize the
domestic court system completely before tapping the Inter-American
system. Argentina's Constitution recasts the Inter-American
Commission and Court as appellate-like tribunals, creating, in the words
of one delegate, "a fourth and fifth" level of judicial review.224
This arrangement, with the Inter-American system constitutionally
superimposed on the Argentine system like Russian stacking dolls,
creates a zero-sum, highly-competitive relationship among these two
transnational actors, undermining efforts to create a harmonious
"epistemic community." Consider the following example.225 Argentine
non-profit law grants organizations serving the "public good" tax-exempt
status. A public interest group, representing the interests of homosexuals
and lesbians, asserts that it is an organization serving the "public good"
preliminary report, the Commission must either: 1) decide that the matter has been rectified; 2)
submit the case to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights; or 3) issue a final report which
includes recommendations and may be published. See id. art. 51. See also Advisory Opinion
OC-13/93, Inter-Am. C.H.R., ser. A, no. 13 (July 16, 1993).
If the Commission decides to submit the case to the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, it does so in a type of "solicitor general" capacity. The Court may only hear cases if the
States Parties have agreed to its jurisdiction. See American Convention, supra note 44,art. 62.
If the Court finds that a State Party violated the Convention, it may rule that "the injured party
be ensured the enjoyment of his right" and may also receive "fair compensation." Id. art. 63(1).
The Court may also adopt provisional measures, in "cases of extreme gravity and urgency." Id.
art. 63(2).
See also Holly Dawn Jarmul, The Effect of Decisions of Regional Human Rights
Tribunals on National Courts, 28 N.Y.U. INT'LL. & POL 311,312-28 (1995-1996) (describing
the Inter-American system); Thomas Buergenthal, The Inter-American System forthe Protection
of Human Rights, 1981 INTER-AM. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 80; Mary Caroline Parker, "Other
Treaties": The Inter-American Court of Human Rights Defines its Advisory Jurisdiction, 33
AM. U. L. REV. 211(1983).
223. See American Convention, supra note 44, art. 46(1)(a) ("Admission by the
Commission of a petition or communication... shall be subject to the following requirements:
a. that the remedies under domestic law have been pursued and exhausted in accordance with
generally recognized principles of international law."). An applicant does not have to exhaust
his remedies, however, if "(a) domestic legislation of the state concerned does not afford due
process of law for the protection of the right or rights that have allegedly been violated; (b) the
party alleging violation of his rights has been denied access to the remedies under domestic law
or has been prevented from exhausting them; and (c) there has been an unwarranted delay in
rendering a final judgment under the aforementioned remedies." Id. art. 46(2)(a).
See also Jarmul, supra note 222, at 315 (exhaustion requirement not strictly enforced
where petitioner was not afforded due process, was denied access to domestic remedies, or was
subject to an unwarranted delay).
224. See REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 35, June 24, 1994, 5:30 P.M., at 1975 (statement of
Alberto E. Balestrini).
225. This example is based on alive case. See "Comunidad Homosexual Argentina," CSJN
146 E.D. 228 (1991); "Comunidad Homosexual Argentina c/ Inspeci6n General de Justicia,"
CApel. CC, Buenos Aires (July 12, 1990) (copy on file with Author).
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and that it should be granted tax-exempt status. The District Court
disagrees, arguing that an organization serving homosexual interests
does not serve the "public good." The Civil Court of Appeals agrees
with the District Court, and the Supreme Court upholds the decisions of
the lower courts. All Argentine courts interpret the American
Convention's guarantee of equal protection of the laws in reaching their
decision.226 The public interest group then brings its case to the Inter-
American Commission, arguing that Argentina's denial of tax-exempt
status discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation, thus violating the
American Convention. The claim is admissible because the public
interest group has exhausted all domestic remedies.227 The Commission
issues a report that concludes that Argentina has violated the American
Convention and asks Argentina to grant the petitioner-organization tax-
exempt status.228 Argentina does not respond to the Commission's report
within the allotted time,229 and the Commission then decides to bring the
case to the Inter-American Court.23' The Court hears the case and
ultimately decides that Argentina did, indeed, violate the Convention by
discriminating against the public interest group on the basis of sexual
orientation.
Now what? If Argentina bends to accommodate the Inter-American
Court's ruling, then it risks undermining the budding legitimacy of its
own court system. As noted above, the domestic courts are the key
transnational actors in Argentina's bid to internalize international law,
and yet they have been notoriously weak, corrupt, and ineffective.23'
226. See American Convention, supra note 44, art. 24 ("All persons are equal before the
law. Consequently, they are entitled, without discrimination, to equal protection of the law.").
227. See American Convention, supra note 44, art. 46(l)(a).
228. See id. art. 50(1).
229. See id. art. 51(1).
230. See id.
231. The Argentine court system has been deemed to lack independence and to be relatively
corrupt. See Tim Dockery, The Rule of Law Over the Law of Rulers: The Treatment of De
Facto Laws in Argentina, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1578, 1633 n.538 (1996) (citing public
opinion polls demonstrating that Argentine citizens believe that the judiciary is corrupt and
lacks independence from the executive); Garro, supra note 29, at 1. See also William C. Banks
& Alejandro D. Carrio, Presidential Systems in Stress: Emergency Powers in Argentina and the
United States, 15 MICH. J. INT'LL. 1,37 (1993) (stating that the Argentine courts and Congress
have done little to consolidate the rule of law in Argentina). See also generally Owen M. Fiss,
The Limits of Judicial Independence, 25 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 57 (1993).
The 1994 bombing of a Jewish Community Center, killing ninety-nine people, provides
a current example of an ineffectivejudiciary. See Kenneth J. Levit, Terrorism, Democracy and
the Jews ofArgentina, 22 HUM.RTS. 26, 1995. The investigation has proceeded at an extremely
slow pace. See Katherine Ellison, Jewish Center Bombing Probe Fails to Get Results,
HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 15, 1995, at 27. Much evidence suggests that the Menem government
itself, including the police, played a significant role in the bombing. See Sebastian Rotella,
Argentine Police Held in '94 Blast, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1996, at Al. Despite weekly protests
in front of the tribunales (courts), the courts have yet to conduct a meaningful, independent
trial. Furthermore, violence against Jewish targets continues. See Calvin Sims, Jewish
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Concomitantly, the rule of law has been problematic. 32 Most scholars
agree that the rule of law and an independent judiciary are crucial to
Argentina's attempt to fortify democracy,23 3 perhaps the most important
bulwark in the protection of individual rights. How, then, can a
country's highest court effectively consolidate the rule of law when
another court second-guesses its decisions? How can a court system
build legitimacy and fortify its public image when a competing court
system says, "almost, but not quite right"? If domestic courts,
particularly the Supreme Court, are to be effective "transmission belts,"
the public must perceive them as strong and legitimate. A contrary Inter-
American Court decision that Argentina grafts onto its domestic system,
however, reveals the vulnerability of the courts and the potentially
ephemeral nature of their decisions-hardly legitimating and fortifying
attributes.
What if Argentina ignores the Inter-American Court decision and
the Supreme Court's decision rests? While Argentine courts might earn
legitimacy, this move would undermine the legitimacy of the Inter-
American system. It would also clash with efforts to consolidate the rule
of law in Argentina itself. By virtue of the American Convention, the
Inter-American human rights system is a part of the Constitution and the
domestic legal fabric .2 ' Thus, a dismissal of an Inter-American Court
decision is tantamount to a dismissal of the Argentine Constitution. As
Argentina attempts to consolidate the rule of law-one of the weakest
links being adherence to constitutional norms-it must attempt to abide
by, rather than deviate from, its own Constitution.
Argentina's internalization strategy has created a classic zero-sum
game between two transnational actors, the Argentine courts and the
Inter-American human rights system. To legitimize the domestic courts'
decisions is to denigrate the legitimacy of the Inter-American system.
On the other hand, to enhance the credibility of the Inter-American
Commission and Court decisions is to detract from Argentina's efforts
to bolster the image of its judiciary, as well as efforts to use the new
Constitution as a vehicle to consolidate the rule of law.
This conundrum was not inevitable. If Argentina had internalized
the substantive rights contained in human rights treaties rather than the
entire treaties, then it would have reserved primacy for Argentine
Cemetery is Desecrated in Argentina, the Third this Year, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1996, at A7.
232. See supra notes 164 and accompanying text.
233. For an in-depth look at the role of an independent judiciary in Argentina's transition
to democracy, see the compendium of pieces in TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN
AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY (Irwin P. Stotzky ed., 1993). See also Stotzky, supra
note 164 and accompanying text; Fiss, The Limits of Judicial Independence, supra note 231 and
accompanying text; Carlos Santiago Nino, Transition to Democracy, Corporation, and
Constitutional Reform in Latin America, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 129 (1989).
234. See supra notes 221-24 and accompanying text.
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courts.23 5  For the Constitutional Assembly, however, human rights
treaties were hermetically-sealed, inseparable packages.236 Instead,
Argentina's Constitution now identifies two supreme arbiters of the law:
the Supreme Court, as provided for in Article 116 of the Constitution237
and, via the conduit of Article 75(22), the Inter-American Court, whose
jurisdiction rests on the exhaustion of domestic remedies238 and whose
decisions are binding on States Parties.239 Wholesale constitution-
alization of the Inter-American system, as well as the rights contained in
the American Convention, created this tug-of-war between the Argentine
judiciary and the Inter-American Court.
In spite of its apparent commitment to the treaty-as-package-
wholesale-incorporation process, the Constitutional Assembly could
have anticipated the dilemma it was creating and neutralized this
competitive, zero-sum relationship through artful drafting. However,
only one delegate recognized the potential for competitive conflict
between the Argentine judiciary and the Inter-American human rights
system;240 and a few other delegates recognized that by virtue of the
constitutional amendments, Argentina was importing a new juridical
system into its Constitution.241 By stating that human rights treaties may
235. Prior to Argentina's constitutionalization ofthe American Convention, it was not clear
what the domestic juridical effect of Inter-American Court decisions would be. While the
American Convention provides that "[t]he States Parties to the Convention undertake to comply
with the judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties," there are no formal Inter-
American mechanisms to ensure that States Parties enforce decisions. American Convention,
supra note 44, art. 68(1). See also Jarmul, supra note 222, at 317. Nonetheless, political
pressure from the Commission, the Organization of American States, or other countries
frequently prods a country into compliance. See id. While States Parties assumed legal
obligations vis-k-vis Article 68 of the American Convention, there was no practical enforcement
mechanism other than political pressure. Furthermore, domestic courts, as opposed to
legislatures or the executive, were not the primary compliance engines.
236. See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text. A few delegates made proposals
which included the constitutionalization of rights (along the lines of the constitutions discussed
supra notes 55-86) rather than the entire treaties themselves. See REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No.
10, June 9, 1994, 3:30 P.M., at 394 (statement of Marta N. Martino de Rubeo); REC. CONST.
ASSEMBLY No. 26, June 23, 1994, 1:30 P.M., at 1255 (statement of Juan C. Hitters); REC.
CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 28, June 23, 1994,7:00 P.M., at 1438 (statement of Marfa C. Vallejos).
However, neither the Treaty Commission nor the Drafting Committee appeared to entertain
these proposals seriously.
237. CONST. ARG. (1994) art. 116.
238. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
239. See American Convention, supra note 44, art. 62.
240. See REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 35, June 24, 1994,5:30 P.M., at 1975 (statement of
Alberto E. Balestrini) (recognizing that the Inter-American Court and Commission decide issues
of law that will, by virtue of the constitutionalization of these institutions, stand above domestic
constitutional decisions, thereby creating a fourth or fifth level of appeal).
241. See REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY NO. 19, June 17,1994, 11:00 A.M., at 779 (statement of
Marfa N. Meana Garcfa, Pablo Verani, Horacio Massaccesi & Santiago A. Hernandez)
(international and regional courts will makejuridical pronouncements); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY
No. 20, June 21, 1994, 1:00 A.M., at 832 (statement of Marfa Bercoff) (individuals have the
right to petition international and regional human rights systems to vindicate human rights);
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not curtail or limit enumerated rights,242 Article 75(22) clearly reveals
that the Constitutional Assembly recognized the potential for conflict
between substantive rights, as provided for in Titles I and II of the
Constitution, and the panoply of substantive rights appended by virtue
of constitutional incorporation of human rights treaties.243 Just as the
Constitutional Assembly resolved substantive conflicts, it could have
resolved more procedural conflicts by drafting a provision that addressed
the tension. For example, the Constitution could have stated the
following: "Supreme Court decisions, granting due regard to extant
international juridical pronouncements, are final and non-reviewable by
any supranational institution," or, alternatively, "Supreme Court
decisions are presumptively final but subject to the ultimate jurisdiction
of the Inter-American Court." While the former may not enhance the
legitimacy of the Inter-American system and the latter may not enhance
the legitimacy of the Supreme Court, either option would have defined
their relationship and preempted competitive and potentially destructive
vying for power. Either option would have also defined a rule of law:
either Supreme Court decisions are final or they are subject to review.
Thus, abiding by that rule would have helped consecrate and consolidate
the rule of law in a society where lawlessness and anomie have been
prevalent.2' Instead, we are left with two important transnational actors
on a collision course.
B. The Promises
Percolating below the surface are some nascent reasons for
optimism. Prodded by energetic NGOs, some judges are beginning to
REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 20, June 21, 1994, 1:00. P.M., at 835 (statement of Ana M.
Dressino) (human rights treaties, and their interpretation, should be subjected to the ultimate
jurisdiction of supranational organizations); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 22, June 22, 1994,
1:00 P.M., at 898 (statement of Juan F. Armagnague) (supranational organizations generate
rules of law that Argentina must follow); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 26, June 23, 1994, 1:30
P.M., at 1255 (statement of Juan C. Hitters) (recognizing that the Inter-American system has
Commission and Court institutions and not only substantive rights).
242. CONST.ARG. (1994) art. 75(22) ("The rights granted in these treaties do not curtail the
rights or guarantees provided for in the first part of the Constitution and should be understood
as complementing the rights and guarantees provided for therein.").
243. Several delegates offered proposals regarding the potential conflict between written
rights and appended rights. See REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 17, June 15, 1994, 9:30 P.M., at
670 (statement of Cecilia Lipsyzc, Juan Schroeder, Maria Sanchez, Rina Leiva, Daniel Garcfa,
Adriana Puiggr6s & Ana M. Pizzurno) (human rights treaties shall guide and condition the
interpretation of domestic law); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 19, June 17, 1994, 11:00 A.M.,
at 779 (statement of Maria N. Meana Garcfa, Pablo Verani, Horacio Massaccesi & Santiago A.
Hernandez) (same); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 26, June 23, 1994, 1:30 P.M., at 1255
(statement of Juan C. Hitters) (interpret the Constitution and internal law in conformity with the
Universal Declaration and the American Convention); Rec. Const. Assembly No. 35, June 24,
1994; 5:30 P.M., at 1975 (statement of Alberto E. Balestrini) (same).
244. See supra notes 231-33 and accompanying text.
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embrace international human rights law as a primary, if not the primary,
source of individual rights. International human rights treaties are also
slowly trickling toward untouched segments of society, and Article
75(22) may have some latent allies.
1. Unlikely Bedfellows: Potential Transnational Actors
Argentina's human rights internalization strategy may have some
unexpected, yet largely untapped allies. Apparently, the impetus for
constitutionalization of human rights treaties was not a magnanimous
desire to sanctify human rights or a desire to repent for a dark past; it was
instead an outgrowth of regional integration and regional trading
blocks-namely Mercosur-and Argentina's desire to be a welcome and
powerful member of such blocs.24 In debate and public statements
regarding Article 75(22), delegates incessantly referenced economic
integration, and virtually all the delegates that spoke about the provision
underscored its importance in terms of Mercosur and/or economic
integration. For some delegates, sovereignty was the link: if sovereignty
concerns had created resistance to human rights treaties and systems in
the past, then Argentina's entrance into Mercosur, and its concomitant
abdication of power to a supranational entity, neutralized these
concerns. 246 Other delegates believed that if Argentina was going to
make an honest attempt to join the international community, its joining
a regional trade bloc was insufficient-Argentina also needed to
participate in a multitude of international organizations, including those
that promoted human rights.247 As proof, many delegates referenced
245. See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
246. See REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 20, June 21, 1994, 11:00 A.M., at 832 (statement of
Maria Bercoff) (resigned to the fact that countries have ceded authority to supranational trading
blocs, thus arguing that Argentina should not hesitate to cede authority in the human rights
context); REC. CONsT. ASSEMBLY No. 20, June 21, 1994, 11:00 A.M., at 835 (statement of Ana
M. Dressino) (regional integration demonstrates that countries can legitimately transfer
authority and sovereignty to supranational entities).
247. See REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 16, June 15, 1994, 3:00 P.M., at 611 (statement of
Jorge D. Amena, Susana S. de De Maria, Maria C. Allenano & Augusto Acufia; REC. CONST.
ASSEMBLY No. 19, June 17, 1994, 11:00 A.M., at 786 (statement of Guillermo E. Estevez
Boero, Alfredo P. Bravo & Norberto L. La Porta) (in order to take advantage and participate in
regional integration, it is necessary to participate in international organizations and therefore
give more than lip service to international norms, among the most prominent being the
Universal Declaration and the subsequent development of regional human rights system); REC.
CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 22, June 22, 1994, 1:00 P.M., at 898 (statement of Juan F. Armagnague)
(discussing the European Union and the importance of creating international communities to
nurture not only trade but also human rights); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 24, June 22, 1994,
5:00 P.M., at 1013 (statement of Alberto A. Natale, Pablo A. Cardinale & Carlos A. Caballero
Martin) (also discussing European Union)); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 26, June 23, 1994,
1:30 P.M., at 1255 (statement of Juan C. Hitters) (international integration treaties, human
rights treaties, and in fact all international treaties are integrated components of a new
international world order); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 28, June 23, 1994, 7:00 P.M., at 1438
(statement of Maria C. Vallejos) (international integration is socio-economic, and thus,
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other countries who had constitutionally elevated the status of
international human rights norms as part of a concerted effort to enhance
the states' standing and prominence in the international community.248
The ultimate structure of Article 75 further illustrates the marriage
between human rights and trading interests. Article 75 also provides the
following: 1) Congress has the power to approve and disapprove of
treaties regarding international/regional integration even if it involves
delegating power to supranational entities; 2) these treaties enjoy a status
superior to domestic law; and 3) approval of integration treaties with
Latin American states only requires an absolute majority vote of both
houses of the legislature.249 In fact, most members of the Constitutional
Assembly that proposed language concerning incorporation of
international human rights norms concurrently proposed language
concerning the approval and status of treaties regarding integration. 5 °
Argentina must embrace human rights as well as regional trade); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No.
31, June 24, 1994, 12:00 P.M., at 1701(statement of Enrique de Vedia) (building an
international community requires rising to certain international standards, namely fundamental
human rights standards); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 33, June 24, 1994, 2:00 P.M., at 1840
(statement of Emilia I. Juafiuk, Federico R. Puerta, Julio c. Humada & Jos6 D. Fabio) ("It is
absolutely necessary that communities join to create conditions favorable to the utilization of
progress, to open markets, to find peaceful solutions to conflicts. All in all, to improve the basic
living standard and the quality of life."); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 35, June 24, 1994, 5:30
P.M., at 1975 (statement of Alberto E. Balestrini) (building an international community requires
protection of human rights).
248. See REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 17, June 15, 1994, 9:30 P.M., at 659-60 (statement
of Marcelo Bassani) (focusing on regional integration and discussing the Constitutions of
Uruguay, Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay; as well as European Union and the Treaty of Rome);
REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 19, June 17, 1994, 11:00 A.M., at 786 (statement of Guillermo E.
Estevez Boero, Alfredo P. Bravo & Norberto L. La Porta) (discussing Guatemala, Honduras,
El Salvador, Panama, Costa Rica and Peru); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 21, June 21, 1994,
6:00 P.M., at 848 (statement of Nilda Romero) (discussing Spain, France, Germany, and
Brazil); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 26, June 23, 1994, 1:30 P.M., at 1255 (statement of Juan
C. Hitters) (discussing Spain and Portugal, as well as provinces); REC. CoNST. ASSEMBLY No.
35, June 24, 1994, 5:30 P.M., at 1975 (statement of Alberto E. Balestrini) (discussing Italy,
France, Germany); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 31, June 24, 1994, 12:00 P.M., at 1701
(statement of Enrique de Vedia) (discussing Germany, Spain, France, Italy and Belgium).
249. See CONST. ARG. (1994) art. 75(24) (Congress shall have the power to "approve or
disapprove treaties regarding integration that delegate power and jurisdiction to supranational
organizations, under conditions of equality and reciprocity and respecting the democratic order
and human rights. These treaties shall have a status superior to domestic law. Approval of
these treaties with Latin American countries shall only require an absolute majority of both
houses of Congress .... The renouncement of these treaties will require the prior approval of
an absolute majority of both houses of Congress.").
250. See the proposed constitutional provisions in REC. CONST. ASSEMBLYNo. 17, June 15,
1994, 9:30 P.M., at 654 (statement of Elisa M.A. Carrio); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 20, June
21, 1994, 11:00 A.M., at 832 (statement of Marfia Bercoff); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 20,
June21, 1994,1 1:00A.M., at 835 (statementofAnaM. Dressino); REC.CONST.ASSEMBLYNO.
22, June 22, 1994, 1:00 P.M., at 898 (statement of Juan F. Armagnague); REC. CONST.
ASSEMBLY No. 24, June 22, 1994, 5:00 P.M., at 1013 (statement of Alberto A. Natale, Pablo
A. Cardinale & Carlos A. Caballero Martfn); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 24, June 22, 1994,
5:00 P.M., at 1071 (statement of Juan M. Pedersoli, Olga C. Abraham & Pascual A. Rampi);
REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY NO. 25, June 22, 1994,8:30 P.M., at 1138 (statement of Alicia Oliveira
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Human rights, international trade, and regional integration became a
tightly knit package, and the Constitution reflects this interwoven
relationship.
Those affiliated with trading interests and successful regional
integration thus maintain a stake in the effective internalization of human
right norms. As several delegates stated, Argentina's human rights
record is a potent indicator of its ability to cooperate in regional
economic relationships."' Among the Argentine business community,
therefore, Article 75(22) may find engaged members of its epistemic
community.
2. Mobilization of Key Transnational Actors: The NGOs
While the Argentine court system's failure to embrace international
human rights norms has stymied compliance efforts, its reaction to the
legal changes may be a result of benign ignorance rather than informed
malevolence. Courts may not understand how to utilize human rights
treaties or how such treaties fit into the legal hierarchy. Fortunately,
through briefs and memorials, some NGOs are engaging in an instructive
dialogue with courts. 2  In Argentina, NGOs played a prominent role in
the 1970s in publicizing and, ultimately, curtailing human rights
abuses.253 Regarding enforcement of Article 75(22), the most active
NGO is the Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (Center of Legal and
Social Studies, or CELS).254 With the assistance of a Ford Foundation
grant, the CELS is engaged in a campaign to educate judges and
& Eugenio R. Zaffaroni); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 26, June 23, 1994, 1:30 P.M., at 1255
(statement of Juan C. Hitters); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 31, June 24, 1994, 12:00 P.M., at
1701 (statement of Enrique de Vedia); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 35, June 24, 1994, 5:30
P.M., at 1975 (statement of Alberto E. Balestrini).
A few members did not link human rights and integration in their proposals. See REC.
CONST. ASSEMBLYNO. 17, June 15, 1994,9:30 P.M., at 659-60 (statement ofMarcelo Bassani);
REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 22, June 22, 1994, 1:00 P.M., at 88 (statement of Augusto J.M.
Alasino); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 26, June 23, 1994, 1:30 P.M., at 1193 (statement of
Maria S. Farias, Federico P. Russo & Hebe A. Maruco); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY No. 28, June
23, 1994,7:00 P.M., at 1438 (statement of Maria C. Vallejos); REC. CONST. ASSEMBLY NO. 33,
June 24, 1994, 2:00 P.M., at 1840 (statement of Emilia I. Juafiuk, Federico R. Puerta, Julio C.
Humada & Josd D. Fabio).
251. See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
252. For an excellent discussion of the importance of NGOs in enforcement of human rights
norms, see Kathryn Sikkink, Human Rights, Principled Issue- Networks, and Sovereignty in
Latin America, 47 INT'L ORG. 411,415-23 (1993). See also generally NGOS, THE UNITED
NATIONS, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Thomas G. Weiss & Leon Gordenker eds., 1996).
253. See Sikkink, supra note 252, at 423-28; Sims, supra note 159, at A4.
254. The CELS is recognized as a leading human rights advocacy group and think tank.
See Faiola, supra note 159, at A25; Briscoe, supra note 159, at 7; Friedland, supra note 159,
at A15.
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practitioners regarding the post-1994 status of human rights treaties,
highlighting their potency and import. 5
It is one of CELS' self-professed missions to educate courts about
"the State's international obligations," seeing as Argentina reaffirmed its
commitment to "fulfill these obligations" during the 1994 constitutional
reform process.256 Through briefs and other pleadings, the CELS
describes at length the elevated status of international human rights law
and implores courts to respect treaties and to harness their potential. For
example, in a case challenging the constitutionality of denying an AIDS
patient new "cocktail" drugs that have proven effective in combating the
onslaught of the disease, CELS sought to employ international law in
support of its case. Instead of merely listing international treaties along
with domestic sources of law, however, as many courts do,257 the CELS
engaged in a written lecture about the new status of international human
rights law:
The constitutional status of human rights treaties is not
designed only to complement the dogmatic part of the
Constitution but rather, and necessarily, to condition the
exercise of all public power, including the exercise of judicial
power, to respect and guarantee these international
instruments. Given the constitutional hierarchy granted to the
human rights treaties, their violation constitutes not only an
assumption of the State's international responsibilities but also
a violation of Argentina's own Constitution. On an internal
level, the failure to apply these treaties on the part of domestic
tribunals could result in the adoption of arbitrary decisions by
ignoring norms with constitutional status.
The domestic tribunals are the entities that can assure that
all international obligations regarding human rights assumed
by the State... are entirely respected and guaranteed by other
powerful entities within the State. According to one scholar,
'The state has the right to delegate the application and
interpretation of treaties to the judicial power. Nonetheless, if
the tribunals commit errors in their work or decide not to give
255. The project is referred to as Programa sobre Aplicaci6n del Derecho Internacional
de los Derechos Humanospor los Tribunales Locales (Programa DIDH) [Program Regarding
the Application of International Human Rights Law by Local Courts].
256. Memorial en Derecho, en Calidad de Amici Curiae, del Centro de Estudios Legales
y Sociales (CELS), y el Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL) s/ Libertad de
Expresi6n y Calumnias e Injurias a Funcionarios Pdblicos (amicus curiae brief submitted by
CELS and CEJIL), "Eduardo G. Kimel," Buenos Aires (Mar. 1996) (translations by the Author).
257. See supra notes 200-01 and 213-18 and accompanying text.
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effect to the treaties, . . . then, through their decisions, the
State violates the treaties.'258
The CELS repeats this "lecture" frequently, reinforcing to courts their
responsibilities and the import of breeding Argentine compliance with
human rights law." 9
Some courts have internalized this message, regurgitating similar
language in many of their opinions. For example, two judges who
included in their opinions a discussion on the status of international
treaties, chose language highly reminiscent of the CELS "lecture":
The constitutional status of human rights treaties conditions
the exercise of all public power, including the exercise of
judicial power, to respect and guarantee these instruments. If
courts do not apply these treaties, it could signify the adoption
of arbitrary decisions by ignoring norms with constitutional
status. The courts carry the burden of assuring that all
international obligations assumed by Argentina with regard to
human rights, are entirely respected and guaranteed; if the
tribunals commit errors in the application or interpretation of
treaties, their decisions will impose on the State a violation of
the same treaties and responsibility before the international
community.26°
Through crafted brief writing, the CELS is successfully educating
judges. While these opinions represent only a few isolated examples,
they may be cause for cautious optimism regarding the ability of courts,
when guided, to harness human rights treaties' invigorated potential.
258. Acci6n de Amparo Contra Instituto de Servicios Sociales para Jubilados y
Pensionados, (Martfn Abregti & Victor E. Cosarin, attorneys) (photocopy on file with Author)
(quoting LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 346 (1961) (translations by the Author).
259. See Human Rights Watch/Americas & Centro por la Justicia y el Derecho
Internacional, Memorial en Derecho Amicus Curiae, "Mignone, Emilio F. s/ presentaci6n,"
reprinted in 33 EL DERECHO 8834 (Sept. 14, 1995) (using identical language as that quoted
above in explaining the status of international human rights treaties) (photocopy on file with
Author); Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS), Memorial sobre el Derecho
Internacional de Los Derechos Humanos Relativo a las Condiciones de Detencion de Los
Enfermos con HIV y a la Restrictividad con que Debe Aplicarse la Prision Preventiva, "Sterla,
Silvia s/ Interrupci6n de la Prisi6n Preventiva" [hereinafter CELS MEMORIAL] (Sept. 1996)
(using identical language as that quoted above in explaining the status of international human
rights treaties) (photocopy on file with Author) (translations by the Author); PromueveAmparo,
"Mariela Cecilia Viceconte" (Martfn Abregil & Victor Cosarin, attorneys) (same) (photocopy
on file with Author); Promueve Demanda de Amparo, "Sofia Tiscornia" & "Emilio Fermin
Mignone" (Gast6n Chillier & Victor Cosarin, attorneys) (same) (photocopy on file with
Author).
260. "Paris, Alfredo Oscar s excarcelaci6n," Olivos, at V (Nov. 1996) (constitutionality
of prison conditions for prisoner who is chronically ill) (translations of the case are by the
Author). See also "Cornador, Hernan Nicolas s/ internaci6n," Olivos, at I (Nov. 1996)
(constitutionality of prison conditions for HIV positive prisoners) (translations of the case are
by the Author). While this passage is a translation, the original Spanish version is a verbatim
copy of the Spanish version cited supra note 258 and accompanying text.
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The CELS, however, is not merely conditioning judges by feeding
useful language. It is also implicitly teaching judges how to improve the
analytic depth of their opinions through the use of Giroldi-approved
sources. 261 For example, in a memorial concerning prison conditions,
particularly those for prisoners who tested positive for HIV,262 the CELS
cited the typical panoply of sources, including the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights,263 the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Political Rights, 2 4 the Universal Declaration, 265 and the
American Convention on Human Rights.266 In addition, the CELS cites
some "non-traditional," interpretive sources pursuant to Giroldi's
admonition to employ international jurisprudence in aid of judicial
interpretation: the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
in interpreting the state's obligations with regard to the right to health; 267
the UN Commission on Human Rights reports with regard to state
obligations in the face of the AIDS epidemic;268 and the European
Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights with regard to the meaning of "inhumane treatment. 269
These interpretive sources have seeped into the responsive judicial
opinions, frequently mirroring the briefs citation and language.270 The
CELS' mode of analysis, citing human rights treaties with constitutional
standing and then exploring international jurisprudence as an interpretive
aid, indisputably shaped the courts' analyses, lending variety and depth
to the courts' opinions and instructing courts on the power of Giroldi.27
261. See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 260 and accompanying text and infra note 273 and accompanying text.
263. See International Covenant, supra note 44.
264. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Political Rights, supra note 44.
265. See Universal Declaration on Human Rights, supra note 44.
266. American Convention, supra note 44
267. See "Comador," Olivos (Nov. 1996), at 8.
268. See id. at 10.
269. Id. at 17, 20.
270. For example, onejudge cites the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
for the proposition that states' ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights obliges States Parties to guarantee the right to health, in a non-discriminatory manner,
to all, including those who are HIV-positive. See "Comador," Olivos (Nov. 1996), at I. The
CELS MEMORIAL states, "The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the organ
charged with enforcing the Pact [the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights] ... imposes two obligations with immediate effect: first, states promise to guarantee that
the pertinent rights will be exercised without any discrimination (Art. 2.2), logically including
those who are HIV-positive. The second obligation having immediate effect is to adopt means
to assure [the previous obligation], whether legislative, judicial, administrative, or of any other
type." CELS MEMORIAL, supra note 259, at 8-9. See also "Paris," Olivos, (Nov. 1996) at I (in
case about preventative detention for those who are ill, quoting the same language).
271.. These interpretive sources are slowly finding their way into other opinions. A few
judges have cited the U.N. Commission on Human Rights (see "Paris," Olivos (Nov. 1996), at
VIII; "Comador," Olivos (Nov. 1996)), as well as the European Court on Human Rights (see
"Moreno Ocampo, L." Buenos Aires (Nov. 22, 1996), at 1499.
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With courts enhancing their understanding of the constitutional
status of human rights and their ability to employ varied interpretive
•sources, human rights law appears to be slowly assuming a more
prominent role in judicial decisions, thus portending an increased and
more efficient use of international human rights treaties. Whereas some
courts passively enlisted international law to support conclusions
following constitutional reform,272 a few courts, with the ostensible
prompting of CELS, have begun to use international law as a primary
decision-making engine. In two notable cases concerning health issues,
one dealing with treatment for prisoners with AIDS273 and another
dealing with the legality of preventative detention for those who are ill,274
as well as one case concerning recusal of a biased judge,275 the courts,
while discussing domestic law, mobilized international norms as their
primary analytic tool. With the prodding of dedicated and relentless
NGOs, Argentine courts, in an isolated and haphazard manner, are
becoming more active transnational actors. Time will tell whether the
courts will drive Argentina to compliance and ultimate obedience.
3. Empowering Transnational Actors: The Individual
The constitutionalization of human rights treaties enhanced public
access to international human rights norms. In Argentina, law is
notoriously difficult to find. There is no Argentine form of Westlaw;
there is no Argentine Lexis; there is no current, computerized access to
Supreme Court decisions. The law library at the Universidad de Buenos
272. See supra notes 212-17 and accompanying text.
273. In Cornador, the court addresses the constitutionality of prison conditions for
prisoners with AIDS, ultimately concluding that certain prison conditions implicate several
constitutional and statutory rights, including, but not limited to, the right to health (under the
Universal Declaration and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights); the right to personal integrity (under the International Covenant and the American
Convention); and the right to humane treatment while detained (under the American Declaration
on the Rights and Duties of Man). See "Comador," Olivos (Nov. 1996), at 8.
274. In "Paris," the court explores the legality of preventative detention for prisoners who
are chronically ill. The court concludes that preventative detention for such prisoners is illegal,
ultimately resting its decision on two rights-the right to health and the right to be brought
before a judge within a reasonable period of time-and concluding that the primary legal
sources of these rights are the Universal Declaration, the International Covenant, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the American Convention.
See "Paris," Olivos (Nov. 1996).
275. The court in Moreno Ocampo examined the denial of a request for judicial recusal.
The appellant, Luis Moreno Ocampo, is a popular media personality who exposes corruption
among politicians and members of the judiciary. In a case in which Moreno Ocampo was a
party, he was assigned to ajudge who had been a target of one of his exposes. The judge denied
the motion to recuse, and Mr. Moreno Ocampo appealed. The court reversed the denial of the
motion to recuse, reasoning that the judge denied Moreno Ocampo the right to an impartial
tribunal, citing the American Convention, the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties
of Man, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as primary legal support.
See "Moreno Ocampo, L." Buenos Aires (Nov. 22, 1996).
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Aires is little more than a card catalog. The private universities'
collections are better, but do not closely approximate U.S. standards. To
find the Supreme Court opinions discussed in this Article, the Author
engaged in a multi-day, multi-step process that culminated at the
Supreme Court itself. Even finding a courtroom in the maze labeled Los
Tribunales is a herculean task. In a society where the search for the law
is so cryptic, those who are not trained to access the law, or those who
cannot afford to hire someone so trained, stand highly disenfranchised-
unable to negotiate through the dense web of rights." 6
The Argentine Constitution is one exception to this rule.
Newsstands adorn the streets of Buenos Aires. Along with the papers,
tabloids, Harlequin novels, and soap opera digests, many vendors sell a
copy of the "Constituci6n de la Naci6n Argentina." As a result of
Article 75(22), this popular copy of the Constitution now includes the
following: the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man;
the American Convention on Human Rights; the Universal Declaration;
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Political Rights; the
International Covenant; the Convention on the Prevention and Sanction
of the Crime of Genocide; the International Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women; the
Convention against Torture and other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman, and
Degrading Punishment; and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
While the non-lawyer may not herself be able to vindicate her rights, the
popularization and access-granting effect of constitutionalization
enhances the non-lawyer's ability to identify and claim ownership of
rights. Until a large coterie of public interest lawyers develops in
Argentina, 7 the common person's ability to vindicate human rights
violations may be somewhat limited. Supply frequently follows demand,
however, and the first step in creating demand for such a coterie is to
grant a broader segment of the population access to their panoply of
rights. The constitutionalization of human rights treaties, at a minimum,
creates such access and thus empowers individuals as the ultimate
beneficiaries of such rights.
276. For an enlightening discussion of public interest law in Argentina and the virtual
disenfranchisement of individuals, see Martin F. B6hmer, On the Inexistence of Public Interest
Law in Argentina, Address at Semiario de Latinoamerica sobre Temas Constitucionales (Aug.
17, 1996) (copy on file with Author).
277. See id.
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS: THE LIMITS
OF THE LAW
Argentina's experiment is young and dynamic. At the time of the
writing of this Article, international human rights treaties continue to
seep into the Argentine legal landscape. Just as courts, with the prodding
of CELS, became more receptive to international law, other transnational
actors may similarly ignite processes that breed compliance and,
ultimately, obedience. Thus, any conclusions one may draw from the
Argentine experience are necessarily premature. Nonetheless, the first
round of lessons from Argentina's internalization of international law-
its limits and its latent promises-may help countries craft more potent
internalization strategies.
Argentina's experience demonstrates how to build an epistemic
community that will effectively propel an internalization strategy.
Transnational actors are the constituents of epistemic communities. The
number of transnational actors that support an internalization strategy,
as well as their enthusiasm and mutual relationships, will determine the
relative success or failure of such strategies.
In the Argentine case, the internalization strategy fell relatively flat
because it did not engage, energize and create synergistic relationships
among transnational actors. The Constitutional Assembly debated the
incorporation of human rights treaties in rather generic, undifferentiated
terms; in fact, most debate concerned regional economic integration,
with human rights treaties a mere afterthought. Thus, the constitution-
alization process failed to enlist numerous members of the human rights
community. Constitutionalization ordained the Argentine courts as the
transnational actors responsible for the vindication and protection of
international human rights; yet, the courts, thus far, have been passive
actors. Furthermore, incorporation of entire treaties-treaties which
constitute regional human rights systems-created a competitive, zero-
sum relationship between the Argentine courts and the Inter-American
human rights system. Rather than synergistically entering Article
75(22)'s epistemic community, the Argentine courts and the Inter-
American Commission and Court may vie, in a potentially
counterproductive manner, to be the final arbiter of international human
rights.
The glimmer-the incipient promise-in Argentina's
internalization experiment may also be traced to the identity and
enthusiasm of various transnational actors. By publicizing international
human rights, Article 75(22) may transform the bearers of those
rights-individuals-into transnational actors. While linking Article
75(22) to the creation of a fertile legal climate for regional economic
integration effectively removed human rights from debate and
discussion, it also created potential allies among the trade and business
1999]
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communities. Finally, the energy and enthusiasm of NGOs, who
themselves are members of Article 75(22)'s epistemic community, are
helping transform passive transnational actors-the courts-into active,
energetic transnational actors. Both the problems and the promises in
Argentina's internalization strategy suggest that a large coterie of
energetic and cooperative transnational actors create the "transmission
belt" necessary to propel nations not only toward compliance, but also
toward obedience of international norms.
Furthermore, the nature of the internalization strategy may
determine its ultimate effectiveness. In describing transnational legal
process, Professor Koh notes that internalization may take place via
legal, political or social means.27 Argentina's experience suggests that
in countries where the rule of law and the judiciary have historically been
weak, internalization must be multifaceted, including legal, political, and
social strategies. On its face, Article 75(22), a constitutional
amendment, is a prototypical example of legal internalization. It strives
to harness law to drive internalization of international norms. Law,
however, is one of the weaker Argentine institutions and, within law, the
Constitution is perhaps the weakest.279 While a naked law, especially in
a country like Argentina, will not significantly further obedience, it may
animate political and social actors who, in turn, may further obedience.
In antiseptically removing "human rights" from debate and effectively
treating Article 75(22) as an afterthought-an appendage necessary to
facilitate economic integration efforts-the members of the
Constitutional Assembly missed an opportunity to transform much of the
human rights community into effective social and political actors with
a stake in successful internalization of human rights law. Legal
internalization did not trigger concomitant social and political
internalization processes. And law alone is rather hollow in Argentina.
Argentina now faces a challenge: it must transform a legal gesture into
concrete, programmatic change.
278. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 164, 231-33 and accompanying text.
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Appendix
Table 2: Argentina's Constitutional Treatment of Human Rights: Past
and Present280
International American Argentina Argentina (1994)
Covenant Convention (1953 & amend.)
Art. I: Right to N/A
self-determination
Art. 2: State Art. 1: Race, Art. 16 Art.16/Art.75(23)
obligation to respect color, sex, - 0
the rights and language, religion, (Article 16 does not Art. 75(23)
ensure the rights political or other list categories, (Guarantees equal
"without distinction opinion, national rather it merely opportunity as
of any kind, such as or social origin, states "All its provided for in
race, colour, sex, property, birth or inhabitants are international
language, religion, any other social equal before the treaties)





Art. 3: Equal rights Art. 24: General Art. 37
of men and women equal protection
clause with no (Equal rights for
explicit reference men and women to
to sex hold political
discrimination office)
280. Table 2 compares Argentina's 1853 and 1994 Constitutions, and then compares both
to the International Covenant and the American Convention. Column 1 delineates the rights
in the International Covenant. Column 2 lists the analogous rights in the American Convention,
noting, where appropriate, the differences between the two international instruments. Columns
3 and 4 compare the Argentine Constitutions to these instruments. If a constitutional provision
is analogous to a provision in one of the international documents, the Table notes the article's
number. Furthermore, the Table indicates whether the constitutional provision is similar to (0),
less expansive in scope than (-), or more expansive in scope than (+), the international
instruments. The Table indicates, in bold, those places where the 1994 Constitution enhances
the rights provided for in the 1853 Constitution.
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International American Argentina Argentina (1994)
Covenant Convention (1953 & amend.)
Art. 428: Public Art. 27: Allows Art. 23 Art. 23
emergency allows derogation from Art. 29 Art. 29
suspension of rights; rights during times - - /0
however no of war, public (In event of internal (Same, except
derogation from danger, or other disorder, unlimited Congress cannot
rights to life, emergency. No power to suspend confer upon
prohibition on derogation from Constitution to Executive
torture, slavery, the following: arrest, but not "extraordinary
punishment for right to juridical punish, individuals, powers" or "the
contractual liability, personality; right or transfer whole of public
expostfacto laws, to life; rights to individuals to authority" whereby
recognition as a human treatment; different part of "lives, the honor, or
person, and freedom prohibition on nation) the property" of
of thought & slavery, ex post Argentines shall be
conscience facto laws; affected)
freedom of
conscience; right






Art. 6: Right to life; Art. 4 Art. 18 Art. 18
death penalty only
for the most serious (No death penalty (Same)
crimes, right to for political crimes;
amnesty or pardon no explicit right to
life)
Art. 7: No one Art. 5(2) Art. 18 Art. 18
subject to torture or
other cruel, (No torture or (Same)
inhuman or whipping)
degrading treatment
Art. 8: No slavery Art. 6: Includes Art. 15 Art. 15
or slave trade trafficking in 0 0
women
281. The state of emergency provisions are exceptions to the rights granted in international
instruments and constitutions. Thus, a state of emergency provision that permits curtailment
of many rights under many circumstances circumscribes fundamental rights. The more
expansive the state of emergency provision, the less expansive other rights. Thus, abroad state
of emergency provision that allows many derogations receives a "- ," while a narrower state
of emergency provision that allows few derogations receives a" + ."
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International American Argentina Argentina (1994)
Covenant Convention (1953 & amend.)
Art. 9: Liberty and Art. 7(1-6) Art. 18 Art. 18 (Warrant)
security of the Art. 43
person; no arbitrary (Warrant) (Habeas corpus)
arrest; informed of
the charges and the
reason for the arrest;
prompt recourse to
judicial process;




Art. 10: All those Art. 5 Art. 18 Art. 18
detained shall be
treated with (Provides for clean (Same)
humanity; accused and safe prisons
shall be segregated designed for










Art. 12: Liberty to Art. 22: Includes Art. 14 Art. 14
move within a right to asylum; -
country and to leave may restrict these ("Entering, (Same)
the country, except rights "to the remaining in,
for restrictions extent necessary in traveling through
provided by law in a democratic and leaving
order to protect society to prevent Argentine
national security, crime or to protect territory")
public order, public national security,
health, morals or the public safety,
rights and freedoms public order,
of others; no one public morals,
arbitrarily denied public health, or
the right of entry to the rights or
own country freedoms of
others."
Art. 13: Can only Art. 22(6)
expel an alien in
accordance with law
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International American Argentina Argentina (1994)














lawyer and right to
have one appointed


























Art. 15: Art. 9 Art. 18 Art. 18
Prohibition on ex
post facto laws, (Defendant does not (Same)
except if benefits receive benefit of
the defendant subsequent
favorable law)
Art. 16: Everyone Art. 3
has the right to
recognition as a
person
Art. 17: No one Art. 11: Also Art. 18 Art. 18
subjected to includes 0 0
arbitrary or correspondence (Home and personal (Same)
unlawful and unlawful correspondence is
interference with attacks on "honor inviolable)
privacy, family or and reputation"
home
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International American Argentina Argentina (1994)
Covenant Convention (1953 & amend.)
Art. 18: Freedom of Art. 12: Art. 14 Art. 14
thought, conscience Conscience and -
and religion. Can religion (Right "to freely (Same)





health and morals or
fundamental rights
Art. 19: Freedom of Art. 13: Thought Arts. 14 & 32 Arts. 14 & 32
expression & right and expression. -
to hold opinions. Also prohibits ("[To publish ideas (Same)
Right to expression prior censorship, in the press without
may be restricted in excluding prior censorship" &
respect of the rights censorship aimed "Federal Congress
or reputations of at children; and shall not enact laws
others or for prohibits that restrict freedom
protection of government of the press or that
national security or manipulation of establish federal
public order or radio waves jurisdiction over
public health or it")
morals













of public health or
morals
Art. 22: Freedom of Art. 16: Includes Art. 14 (1957 Art. 14 (1957
association and to restrictions on amend) amend)
join trade/labor police and armed - / 0 - /0
unions; restrictions forces ability to ("[T]o associate for (Same)
in the name of form associations useful ends" and
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International American Argentina Argentina (1994)
Covenant Convention (1953 & amend.)





Art. 24: Basic Art. 18: Right to a Art. 75(23)
children's rights to name 0
equal protection; Art. 19: Right to (Women & children
nationality; and legal protection rights)




those born in and
out of wedlock
Art. 25: Equal Art. 23: Specifies Art. 37
opportunity to that the law can 0
partake in public regulate rights
affairs and engage only in the name
in public service; of age, nationality,
right to vote residence,
education, civil &
mental capacity
Art. 26: Standard Art. 24: Does not Art. 16 Art. 16




listed in Article 2
Art. 27: Right of N/A Art. 75(17)
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